

AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL MONTHLY.

JULY, 1870

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN GERMANY.

PART SECOND.

THE corps of instruction of a German University consists of four classes of teachers having very distinct rights, namely, ordinary professors, professors extraordinary, *privat-docenten*, who may be compared to tutors, and, finally, decidedly below the others, the teachers of languages and polite accomplishments. These last have not the degree of doctor, and are hardly distinguishable from the employés of the faculty. They teach all the modern languages, sometimes even those of the East, music, singing, riding, dancing, fencing, swimming, gymnastics, stenography, and writing. These teachers are not merely under the patronage of the university. Their teaching is supervised by the Senate; and their prices are sometimes fixed by a tariff, some even receiving a slight salary.

The ordinary professors form the faculty. The Dean as well as the Rector are always chosen from among them, and they alone are members of the Senate. They are never numerous. The largest faculties of philosophy, as those of Berlin, Vienna, and Breslau, have not more than from twenty-five to twenty-eight of them; a small number, when one considers that in the faculties of philosophy instruction

is given in all the subjects of human knowledge, excepting theology, law and medicine. Their number depends upon the wealth and popularity of the university, and in the small faculties is so insignificant as to be insufficient, and indeed almost absurd. At Jena, the medical faculty contains only five professors; the law faculty at Giessen only four. These professors represent as it were the instruction of the faculty reduced to its meagrest limits, and scarcely sufficing for the academic demands; but they are always supported by larger numbers of extraordinary professors and of *privat-docenten*, who come in to enlarge and complete the scheme of studies. The ordinary professors are appointed by the Sovereign from a list presented by the faculty. The formalities are nearly the same in all the German States. The vacancy of the chair is publicly announced through the newspapers, and any one who has received the degree of doctor can become a candidate by presenting an application to the faculty. The latter in its turn is not obliged to choose from among these candidates; it makes out its own list in perfect freedom at a special meeting, in which only the ordinary professors take part. This list contains generally three names; but when the faculty deems proper, when it wishes to bestow an especial mark of esteem on any candidate he is nominated alone. This honor is customary when the candidate is already ordinary professor in another faculty. The Rector transmits the list to the Minister, and he presents it to the Sovereign, without being at liberty to make any alteration in it. This privilege which the university has of communicating to the ruler of the State the expression of its choice, without limitation from any intermediate authority, is one of its oldest prerogatives, and one of those which it guards with the greatest jealousy. There is no example, even in Austria, of an appointment made by the Sovereign outside of the list of the faculty. There have been certain cases of the refusal of the appointment for political reasons, and under such circumstances the place has remained vacant until matters were reconciled. In such cases the Government imposes a sort of veto; but it would never occur to it to substitute its own candidate for that of the corporation. It sometimes happens also that it complies

with the public sentiment, which has been disregarded by the professors but affirmed by the students. The latter being themselves members of the corporation can, in fact, under certain circumstances, interfere directly. When they think they have a serious reason for not approving the choice which has been made, they have the right to make known to the Sovereign their unheeded desires. One of the best known professors of the Vienna medical faculty oweth his chair solely to a demonstration of this sort.

Every ordinary professor, although he receives a salary from the Government, is exempt by the mere fact of his appointment from the censorship of the Administration. In Germany the Government has never conceived the ingenious idea, which exists in France, of considering the professors as servants of the State, and their stipend as a generous gift which secures gratitude or extinguishes hostility. The eminent Virchow, one of the most noted leaders of the Opposition in Prussia, a professor of the University of Berlin, receives 1,200 or 1,500 thalers from the Treasury without thereby being prevented from attacking the Government in the Parliament, in his lectures, or at public meetings. No Minister has ever thought of insinuating to him that he should hand in his resignation. It is Prussia that pays its professors, not the King. The professor's chair is an inviolable asylum. After the last war there was a professor at Göttingen, a determined partisan of the autonomy of the smaller German States, who entered into open controversy with William the First, and personified the resistance to Prussia at least as distinctly as did the King of Hanover.

The regular salary of the ordinary professors varies in the different universities, and even with different professors in the same university. Every ten years it is increased. Moreover, the academic faculty, in order to attract to itself some famous professor, has sometimes been obliged to offer him extraordinary advantages. At every vacancy a curious sort of appraisal of the value of the professor takes place between the universities. It is all done discreetly, but the bidding is none the less genuine. It is thus that a professor according to his merit as a savant, or his success in his in

struction—the two advantages are equally sought for—is able to advance from the smaller to the more important universities; and if he has a place at Vienna or Berlin, he is obliged to maintain it by unceasing efforts. The professor's chair in Germany is never a place of repose, or the reward of a completed career. There is never-ending toil and contest. Material interests forbid sloth.

In fact, the professor does not receive all his emolument from the State, as is the case in France. A part of it is paid him directly by the students. The French system may have its merits, but it certainly has one disadvantage. The least is that it becomes customary for this fixed salary to be regarded as the recompense for a life consecrated to toil, and not as the remuneration for the work of instruction. The consequence is, that the professor occupies himself but very little with his pupils. Our men of science rarely have about them students from whom they receive fees. They entrench themselves in this matter behind a certain dignity which in Germany is judged very severely. The Germans say to us: "That your instruction is gratuitous, appears to be advantageous to the students, but it is rather more so to the professor, by freeing him from the duty of instruction at hours for which he has the right to maintain that he is not paid." It is doubtful, indeed, whether this system be of advantage to the student. All those who have frequented, or had the direction of laboratories, know that those alone work who pay. We are so constituted. Gratuitous higher instruction is a generous dream, but it is a dream; and, moreover, is it quite just that those studies which lead to honor, to great industries, to brilliant and lucrative positions, should be gratuitous, when no one thinks of demanding the same privilege for that secondary instruction, which now-a-days is indispensable for entrance into the most modest career? There is a certain inconsequence in this.

The Germans find a double advantage in the fact that the professor, besides receiving a fixed salary from the State, is directly paid by his pupils. In the first place, the teacher seeks the more to adapt himself to their needs; and, besides, his fees are always in proportion to his merits, whether the students be attracted by his brilliant lectures, or the wish to

hear the author of famous works. In France the student pays each trimester a certain entrance fee, which, in fact, confers no privileges upon him, since the instruction is open to the public. The sum of these fees is to be added to the price of the examinations and of the diploma. It is a tax upon the title of doctor. In Germany the student chooses, at the beginning of the semester, the courses which he proposes to follow. He inscribes his name with the Secretary, and pays for each one a certain fee fixed at the pleasure of the professor. The rules content themselves with setting a minimum, and the way in which this is established shows the constant tendency of the German universities to render to everyone according to his works. The minimum to be paid by the student for a semestrial course is as many monetary units as the professor gives lessons a week. If he gives, as is not seldom the case, five lessons, the fee is five florins in Austria; in Prussia, five thalers. The professor receives the whole of the fees, but they are paid at the Secretary's office, thereby avoiding any awkwardness. By the income which he draws from the students, the professor is interested in giving a large number of lessons in order to increase the minimum, and to have them good in order to secure many auditors. By that part of his salary which he receives from the State, he is secure in sickness and old age. There is no retired list; the title of professor is held for life. When the professor becomes infirm, he rests. Owing to the extraordinary professors and *privat-docenten*, instruction is not impaired.

The Prussian regulations say: "The mission of the university is by means of lectures and other academic exercises to give general instruction, both scientific and literary, to young men suitably prepared by their elementary studies, and it is moreover to qualify them to enter the different branches of the service of the State and of the Church, as well as the professions which demand a learned education of a high order." It is evident that with its small number of ordinary professors the university cannot fill out such a programme. It is here that the extraordinary professors and the *privat-docenten* come in. At Berlin for twenty-seven ordinary professors in the Faculty of philosophy, there are

thirty-three professors extraordinary. This number is never limited. It depends upon the resources of the university, or the sums that the government puts at its disposal. If the Faculty finds that a new or important branch of science is not represented in their instruction, it seeks a professor extraordinary to fill the gap, or it gives this title to some man of merit whom it wishes to secure, meanwhile waiting for an opportunity to attach him more closely. The professors extraordinary are appointed by the minister on the nomination of the Faculty. Their functions are for life. Often they have no other salary than the student's fees, the amount of which they fix as the other professors do. By way of exception, a regular salary may be granted to those whose courses are not of a nature to attract many pupils.

As to the position of *privat-docent*, it is open to every one who has attained the degree of doctor. It is acquired by a special examination, the details of which are carefully fixed by rule. It is an examination, but without competition. There are no competitive examinations in Germany; they cannot be reconciled with the spirit of a university, which is to leave the entrance free to every capacity, with the number only limited by the necessities of instruction. The *privat-docenten* never receive any other emolument than the student's fees, and lose their title if they remain two years unemployed. They vary the instruction of the Faculty as the extraordinary Professors complete it. The lectures of the *privat-docenten* often serve as repetitions. In fact nothing is more common than to see several courses on the same subject in one Faculty. Hence arises rivalry among the professors which cannot but be of advantage to the students. There is perfect liberty on both sides. The professor teaches what he will and as he will, the student goes where he knows he can best secure economy and profit. A curious rule allows him to attend all the courses of the Faculty *gratis* for the first ten days of the semester. Only at the end of that time is he obliged to make his choice and register himself. A certificate of attendance at a single course, even at that of a *privat-docent*, or at another university, admits one to the examinations, and no examiner takes it amiss that the candidate has not followed his lectures.

The higher German education has been reproached with the fact that the cost is higher than it is with us. Without doubt the sums paid to the professors at the beginning of each semester soon exceed the trimestrial fees of our French student, but we must take into consideration the number of hours given by the professor to his courses, the number of pupils that he has, and the facilities given for practical instruction. One can thus readily convince himself that the expenses of the German student are much more thoroughly repaid, and that the amount of instruction which he would receive in France for the same sum cannot be compared with that which he gets in Germany. And moreover, to appreciate the expense of education in any country, it is not enough to know what the schooling costs, we must ascertain the total amount of the academic expenses added to the general cost of removal and living. It is evident that the smaller university towns offer to students of moderate means advantages of cheap living, which are not to be found in Paris. Certain universities, as that of Greifswald, are attended almost exclusively by poor students, while Bonn and Heidelberg, where it is the fashion to drink wine, are the headquarters of the wealthy and frivolous. Finally, one ought besides to take into account certain conditions which lessen still further the average expenses of studying in Germany. The professor can always at his pleasure exempt a student from the payment of his fee. He always does this for foreigners who bring letters of introduction to him, and we have everywhere found that this hospitality of knowledge is generously practised. Another custom grants the same exemption to the sons of professors and of all the dignitaries of the universities even down to the secretary. The faculty itself can remit all or half of the fees to such students as shall prove their poverty and at the same time give evidence by a special examination of merit and ability. The number of those who profit from these immunities is estimated at 1200, or one-fifth of the German students. The expenses of the students are often defrayed by exhibitions, founded either by the state, by parishes, or by private individuals. At Greifswald, where there are only 350 students, there are more than forty such foundations.

They are divided on examination among students who bring certificates of poverty. There are other and humbler foundations; the university for instance always disposes of a certain number of free plates, in a restaurant of the town, and these are allotted each semester to poor students after a special examination, which is held with a certain solemnity before the assembled faculty, and only includes the subjects studied during the last term. Among institutions which have been founded in a more modern spirit, the solicitude of the *alma mater* for her indigent students is no less constant. There has existed at Heidelberg since the year 1863 an association for the assistance of sick students. The professors belong to the association. The students pay a semi-annual subscription of 30 kreuzers, but are exempt from this in case of poverty. The professors contribute to it their time, care and good will. The patients have a special ward in the hospital, and choose the doctor they prefer. Those who are able pay their board, the others are attended gratuitously. The council of the association is composed of the pro-rector, who corresponds to the rector of other universities, two professors of the medical faculty, a doctor of the town, two professors chosen each year by the senate, and five students. The admission into the council of the physician of the town, who is not a member of the university, is to be noticed. It is an infraction of the ancient customs of such corporations, and may be regarded as an instance of genuine progress.

If we have mentioned the pecuniary assistance given to students in Germany, it is rather as a proof of the universal interest that advanced studies excite there than as one of the merits of the system of instruction. It is very doubtful whether bounties, scholarships, encouragements of all kinds, and prizes (unknown in the German universities,) contribute to the advance of study and science as we appear to believe in France. What is really of importance is the number, merit and independence of the teaching body, and the time it gives to its pupils. It is also a matter of especial importance *that the system of education should be capable of receiving all necessary modifications without delay and without violence.* The higher instruction in France,

imprisoned from its origin in the administrative mould, is to-day the same that it was fifty years ago; scarcely have any new chairs been created. In Germany on the contrary, the system of education, free from all governmental shackles, has continually changed, grown and perfected itself, by the mere rivalry of the various universities. In the last fifty years the number of courses has at least doubled. The faculties of law and theology have remained nearly stationary, but those of medicine and philosophy, more allied to the movement of the age, have seen the number of their instructors increase from day to day. At Berlin the number of professors and *privat-docenten* of the faculties of medicine and philosophy was 127 on the 1st of January, 1862; in 1864 it was 140: an increase of 13 professors in two years, and as each gives on an average two courses, this is an augmentation of twenty-six semi-annual courses. It is true that this astonishing increase has ceased since 1864 at Berlin and at all the German universities. Does this mean that the system of education has reached the point of perfect equilibrium with the needs of the country? We are rather obliged to see in this a consequence of the great political crisis through which Germany is at this moment passing.

GEORGE POUCHET.

LOOSE THREADS IN THE SCHOLASTIC WEB.

MANY noble ships have been lost, because shiftless builders overlook unsound planks. Because of the inefficiency of teachers, the world is filled with dwarfed men. The neglect of certain departments in the early education of a boy will cripple and mar the man. It is neither a long nor a hard task to show this. Too little attention is given to the *style* of compositions. It is not enough that an article faultless in grammatical construction and free from misspelled words is handed to the teacher. I had rather read a badly written original essay than a faultless borrowed one. Old magazines furnish more than half of the compositions handed in for correction. Hereby is encour-

aged barrenness of thought. The boy grown to manhood cannot write a letter without hunting over books for choice expressions, which he neglects to mark as quotations.

I saw a very nice letter, one of the style, written to make an impression, beginning with—"Friendship may live, I grant you, without being fed and cherished by correspondence; but, with that additional benefit, I am of the opinion it will look more cheerful and thrive better," etc., quoting entirely the commencement of one of Prior's letters to Sir Thomas Hanmer. Then came a tit-bit from one of Sterne's gay letters, about being as "Merry and as innocent as our first parents in Paradise." After this, something from Pope, very pleasant to read.

The only merit of the letter was the ingenuity it displayed.

"He always writes just so beautifully, he is very brilliant," said the lady who received the letter. I left her to cherish the pleasant delusion; not telling her, as Lady Montague once told a young girl who was charmed by her lover's epistle, that it was stolen, showing her the sweet lines in Randolph's poems, and bringing upon the miserable plagiarist a just punishment.

Because the compositions of children are not justly attended to, ministers fall back upon their old sermons after a few years; sermons that at the start were not their own. Built upon the principle, "here a little, and there a little."

One of a family of celebrated writers said, in answer to my question, "How is it that you are all gifted in writing?" "Because we were trained to it. When we were little fellows our father compelled us to write sketches, stories, anything of interest occurring during the day. We were required to note down and read aloud before the family. What seemed hard at first became our chief pleasure. If we met with no real incidents, we invented to suit our taste. If we exceeded natural limits, we were corrected. 'Be true to Nature, boys,' was our daily lesson. We took delight in writing because our minds were filled with pleasant fancies. We have never been tempted to borrow imagery or glowing expressions."

The writers educated in this family take a high rank be-

cause of this originality, and are not likely to lose their popularity from poverty of style.

Teachers neglect to train the voices of their young pupils, forgetting the old adage, "As the twig is bent the tree is inclined." If teachers would be more watchful with the little lads, preventing sing-song style, drilling them into the natural, easy tone of voice, the clear enunciation, we might hope that future generations would hear less of the tiresome drawl and hum-drum delivery of the pulpit. Pay more attention to this department, and we shall have more "silver tongued" orators.

Speech is a royal faculty, it floods the world with music and eloquence. Educate the young voices, and by-and-by will rise a race of orators who will play the magician over their audiences—who will bewitch and sway multitudes.

JEAN MCLEAN.

THE EDUCATION OF MECHANICS.

SOMETIME ago the Legislature of Massachusetts directed the State Board of Education to consider the expediency of making provision by law, for giving free instruction to men, women and children in mechanical drawing, either in existing schools, or in those to be established for that purpose, in all the towns in the Commonwealth having more than five thousand inhabitants, and report a definite plan therefor. Messrs. D. H. Mason, John D. Philbrick, G. G. Hubbard, and Joseph White, Committee of the Board of Education, have requested Professor Louis Bail, of the Yale Scientific School, to favor them with information under the following topics:—1. The advantage which might be expected to result from the contemplated instruction in mechanical drawing. 2. The course and methods of instruction appropriate for the object in view. 3. The models, casts, patterns, and other apparatus necessary to be supplied. 4. The organization and supervision of the proposed Drawing Schools. 5. The best means of promoting among the people an interest in the subject of

art education. 6. Any other remarks relating to the subject, not embraced in the foregoing topics.

Professor Bail's response is comprehensive and eminently practical. Its suggestions will be interesting and profitable to educators in all latitudes, hence we give it entire :

"1. The advantages which might be expected to result from the contemplated instruction in mechanical or industrial drawing."

Such instructions will make our nation richer by making our artisans more tasteful and skillful, and by developing the latent talent of the industrial classes.

Without this cultivation no people can aspire to become a first-class manufacturing nation; nor will they be able to compete successfully with the products of skilled industry in the great markets of the world.

Special scientific schools or colleges, are indispensable to the highest development of the arts under consideration; but they are insufficient; for they fail to reach the masses, and therefore cannot reform the industry of the country. The scientific schools have little effect upon the masses of our mechanics, except to prove the height to which the mechanical profession may aspire; they furnish no means acceptable to the great body of mechanics, and offer to them no systematic instruction by means of which they may become more intelligent and skillful in the performance of their labors.

There is too much guess work in our mechanical operations, that can only be obviated by such instruction as you propose. A great deal of time and material is wasted in "cutting and fitting," and making things only "about right;" when absolute certainty and correctness of plan should have been secured before hand. There is no form, however complex, that cannot be indicated by drawing in such a manner, that an intelligent workman, who is competent to read or understand drawings, can execute the object represented with absolute certainty. The simple ability to read plans and drawings fits a man for a good position. In fact the foreman of a shop is often the only man who is able to do this. By leaving our mechanics in this semi-barbarous condition we lose much

money and credit, and lower the intellectual and moral condition of our artisans. The more mind a man brings to bear upon his business the more respectable and self-respecting he will become.

Why is it that a majority of our apprentices are of a foreign parentage? Why is it that American boys are growing too proud to "learn a trade?" Is not the cause found in the fact that our whole system of education has quite ignored an industrial life? The only legitimate result of our educational system will be the production of lawyers and doctors, or at the least, clerks and school teachers. In consequence of this defect, children receive the impression that education has no bearing on mechanics; that a trade is only manual drudgery. The result is that boys select the most effeminate employment in preference to manly mechanical work.

When our educational system provides our youth with some intelligent preparation for the prosecution of industrial labor, the trades will be filled by a more cultivated class of young men, and our boys will blush to be found selling pins and needles; but they will not be ashamed to be seen using the hammer and chisel.

The whole nation is deploring the lack of good Ornamental Designers. We are becoming tired of sending so many millions to Europe for articles that we might produce cheaper at home if we had skillful designers. This branch of industry affects articles for the homeliest use. Beauty of form and ornamentation is the quality always referred to as perfecting the claim to notice and value. It is hoped that the female population will so far as possible occupy a field so well suited to their capacity and taste.

"2. The course and methods of instruction appropriate for the object in view."

I shall perhaps be pardoned if, under this head, I allude freely to my own experience and labors. In apology for this, I will add, that I was, when quite young, appointed professor in the Technic Institution in Nuremberg, Bavaria, which sustained, in connection with the regular scientific (polytechnic) and trade school, an industrial school for mechanics. I have, since this time, been much occupied in

consideration of the interests of the industrial class, and have had constant experience by the *actual teaching* of persons engaged in every common branch of industrial labor. I commenced work in this country in the Mechanics' Institute, New York, and have since had several thousand artisans under my instruction. My experience has led me to entertain the most sanguine hopes for the future of American industrial art. I believe there is no other class so willing to make so great a sacrifice to obtain instruction. Mechanics are the sinew of our commonwealth and deserve the highest consideration of educators. At the conclusion of a lesson, gray-haired mechanics have often almost overpowered me with thanks, saying to me, "This lesson is worth hundreds of dollars to me," or, "I shall work better all my life for this." I have often found a pupil repeating the lessons to others, poorer than himself. I have become so affected by the conviction of the need of mechanics and their desire for knowledge, that I resolved to give a free course of lessons each year to those who are unable to pay for instruction. Of last year's course our school superintendent says, in his report, page 33:—"Within a few weeks I have been told by members of that class that the knowledge obtained is worth hundreds of dollars to them, in the increased facility and exactness with which they are enabled, in their daily work, to prepare their patterns and construct difficult forms in mechanical operations."

The lessons referred to are given in the city hall, on Friday evenings. We shall be happy to have any person interested give us a call.

In no department of our industry would the result of judicious training prove more speedy, obvious, and profitable than in ornamental design. Any system of instruction that fails to provide for this important branch of industry will be defective. The mechanical use of copy books will never make a designer. The competent teacher in ornamental design will be able to do much for his pupils in a few lectures. He will commence by illustrating the simplest form of ornamentation by the use of the dot. He will bring examples from nature, as feathers, shells,

flowers, etc. Next he will draw lines giving the simplest forms, and show their different changes and combinations. A figure composed of a multitude of lines only serves to confuse the mind of the pupil. As the power of analysis increases, more complicated ornaments should be presented. The various styles of ornaments peculiar to different nations must be presented. Beautiful forms of vases, etc., must be presented as models. The taste of the pupil will soon become informed; but he will reap little practical benefit, unless these instructions are preceded by sound elementary training of the hand and eye. This training should form the basis or initial step to every department of drawing.

The pupil in mechanical drawing must first acquire knowledge of the use of the mathematical instruments. He must then learn to draw practical problems in plane and descriptive geometry, which will be found to be the language and interpreter of all mechanical drawing. Next comes isometrical and perspective drawing. At the conclusion of these lessons the pupils are divided into different classes, in accordance with their pursuits. The common practice of commencing mechanical drawing by placing a pattern before the pupil and requiring him to copy it is a miserable caricature upon teaching. Every step of the operation should be performed and thoroughly explained in the presence of the pupil; it should also be illustrated by models.

The instructor should possess broad culture, but he should not confuse his pupils with the variety and extent of his knowledge. He should be able to bring out of his treasures "things new and old," but he should never present any question for speculation or display. He should study to present principles of the greatest practical use to his pupils and to teach them the practical application of these principles. It requires great judgment and experience to select from the mass of knowledge what is most practical and fitting. Our mechanics, as a rule, are too much wearied with labor to find interest in questions outside their calling. They want the prospect of some tangible good to incite them to industry and improvement. It appears to me, therefore, that the initial undertaking should be devoted chiefly to

practical results in the industrial arts. The individuals who are by this course incited to higher attainments will be provided for in some of our scientific schools.

The principal special classes will be as follows:—

1. Machinists. 2. Carriage-makers. 3. Carpenters, joiners, and stair-builders. 4. Tinnerns. 5. Masons and stone-cutters. 6. Carvers and modelers. In connection with these classes lessons should be given in physics, mechanics, chemistry, and mathematics.

I have private notes of my entire course in the different branches of mechanical drawing, and if they can afford any aid in this cause, I should be happy to show them to any gentleman of the board. You may at any time command my services in this good cause.

“3. The models, casts, patterns, and other apparatus necessary to be supplied.”

For descriptive geometry:—Models of various planes, superficies, and solids.

For perspective:—The perspective plane, with various apparatus; also, model for explaining the arches, etc.

For Machine Drawing:—Models of wood of various parts of machinery; a sectional working model of an engine; models for illustrating the principle of belting pulleys; the various wheels and other simple models.

For Architectural Drawing:—Models of the Grecian and Roman orders, and of various styles; models of roofs of houses and steeples, of framework of houses; and models of various winding stairs, doors and windows, etc.

For Carriage-makers:—A simple frame of a carriage for the explanation of the “French rule.”

For Tinnerns:—Envelopes of various geometrical figures and solids.

For carvers, modelers, decorators and designers for fresco, paper hangings, carpets, calico, silver and glass-ware:—A variety of plaster models and ornaments, with a large variety of patterns, ornaments, examples of various styles and countries.

“4. The organization and supervision of the proposed drawing schools.”

The foundation of such branches of education as it is now

proposed to introduce should be laid in our public schools ; therefore the success or failure of the enterprise must depend in a great degree upon the zeal and intelligence of the teachers. The Normal schools should be provided with a thorough and systematic course of instruction. It would be wise to convene a Normal session with the express object of preparing teachers for the work. These teachers should be required to submit to an examination by a competent authority, who should also supervise their work. If it is objected that many of the class it is proposed to benefit by special instruction will not remain in the public schools till they advance to drawing, I reply that a child five years old should begin to learn to draw. The longer instructions are deferred after this age, the greater the loss. As soon as a child enters school, a regular systematic training of the hand and eye should commence. This is of double value, promoting in the child habits of observation and comparison.

This is not a matter of speculation but has been proved by actual practice in this and other cities. If any person doubts the expediency of such early training, a visit to our public schools would convert him. I am certain the time is not far distant when this training will be accomplished, and that our grammar schools will also make some progress in industrial drawing. Drawing from objects and models should become as familiar as writing to the pupils of these schools.

We have been speaking of what *should* be ; our purpose is to take the material we have at hand and make the best use of it. It appears to me that in the special drawing schools we must depend mainly for instructors upon the public school teachers. My experience as teacher leads me to conclude that the preparation of teachers may be accomplished without special difficulty. I have seldom given a course of lessons in industrial drawing to mechanics, but at the conclusion of the term some leading members of the class would step into the front rank and take the position of teacher ; their labors have often been attended with marked success.

Teachers are more intelligent than the industrial classes, more ready to receive and more expert to communicate instruction. I have had many teachers under my instruction

and supervision, and I have found them prompt to receive and impart knowledge. Without doubt each town of five thousand inhabitants has a teacher already somewhat skilled in drawing, who would be willing, with such encouragement as the Board will be able to offer, to fit himself fully for the work. The Board should define strictly the duties of these teachers. In the large towns special drawing schools on a more extended scale should be established.

"5. The best means of promoting among the people an interest in the subject of art education."

The industrial classes here especially referred to are already in advance of educators on this subject, at least this appears to be the case in our vicinity. It was in answer to the persistent demand of this class that drawing was introduced into our public schools.

Copying pretty little drawing patterns has not excited the interest and confidence of the masses, nor the approval of the cultivated class; but we believe the industrial classes may safely be trusted to recognize their true interests. To promote a permanent interest in art education, we have only to consult the greatest good of the people in our plan of instruction. There is nothing like true teaching to arouse and retain the popular heart.

Some people have the impression that everything can be accomplished by words: a good lecture upon art does indeed act as a stimulant, but cannot afford nutrition and growth. "Talking" without "chalking" is to little practical purpose with the masses. Among the advantages that will result from the contemplated course of instruction in our public schools, I omitted to state that the immediate effect would be to elevate the character of our scientific schools. The pupils in these schools have at present little or no preparation in drawing. Consequently a great deal of time that should be spent in advanced study, is devoted to elementary drawing. This greatly detracts from the character and efficiency of these schools.

Apply the same condition of things to any other department of college instruction and the difficulties will be appreciated.

LOUIS BAIL.

THE LABORING FORCE OF THE HUMAN HEART.

THERE is no organ in our bodies that has a more important influence upon health, at all ages of our lives, than the heart, whose rhythm and force are governed by laws of nerve-force, of which we are at present almost totally ignorant. Regarded, however, from a mechanical point of view, as a hydraulic pumping machine, our knowledge of the heart is more accurate, and may yet lead the way to greater knowledge of the physiological action of this vital organ.

The heart, regarded as a pumping-machine, consists of two muscular bags (*ventricles*), one of which drives the blood through the lungs, and the other through the entire body. This blood is forced, by a pumping action, repeated seventy-five times each minute, through both lungs and body, and experiences in each case a resistance which is measured by the hydrostatical pressure of the blood in the pulmonary artery and aorta. The resistance offered to the circulation of the blood, by the capillary vessels of the lungs and body, is different; but the total quantity of blood that passes through the lungs and body in a given time, must be the same; from which it follows, that the resistance offered by the capillaries must be in the proportion of the hydrostatical pressure in the great arteries leading from the ventricles of the heart. If, therefore, we knew that pressure for one side of the heart, and the relative forces of the two ventricles in contracting, we should know the entire resistance overcome by the heart at each of its beats.

If, in addition to the hydrostatical pressure in one ventricle, and its ratio to that in the other ventricle, we knew also the quantity of blood forced out of each ventricle against this pressure, we should have all the elements necessary to calculate the laboring force of the heart, as will be presently shown.

Let the reader grant, provisionally, the following postulates:—

I. That three ounces of blood are driven from each ventricle at each stroke of the heart.

II. That the hydrostatical pressure in the left verticle and aorta, against which the blood is forced out, amounts to a column of blood 9.923 feet in vertical height.

III. That the muscular force of the left ventricle, in contracting, bears to that of the right ventricle the proportion of 13 to 5.

With these postulates granted, we may now proceed to calculate the daily laboring force of the heart as follows. At every stroke of the heart, three ounces of blood are forced out of the left ventricle against a pressure of a column of blood 9.923 feet in height. The work done, therefore, at each stroke is equivalent to lifting three ounces through 9.923 feet. This work is repeated 75 times in each minute, and there are 60×24 minutes in the day. Hence, the daily work of the left ventricle of the human heart is $3 + 9.923 \times 75 \times 60 \times 24$ ounces lifted through one foot; or, since there are 16 ounces in the pound, and 2,240 lbs. in the ton, the work done by the left ventricle of the heart in one day is $\frac{3 \times 9.923 \times 75 \times 60 \times 24}{16 \times 2,240}$ tons lifted through one foot. Reducing this, we find the daily work of the left ventricle is 89.706 foot-tons. The work done by the right ventricle is five-thirteenths of this quantity (post. III.); the daily work of the right ventricle is therefore 34.502 foot-tons. Adding these two quantities together, we find for the total daily work of the human heart 124.208 tons lifted through one foot.

It is not easy for persons unaccustomed to these calculations to appreciate quickly the enormous amount of laboring force denoted by the preceding result. To facilitate this appreciation, compare it with the following descriptions of labor:

1. The daily labor of a working man.
2. The work done by an oarsman in an eight-oar boat-race.
3. The work done by locomotive engines, or animals climbing a height.

1. The daily labor of a working man, deduced from various kinds of labor, from observations spread over many months, is found to be equivalent to 354 tons lifted through one foot, during the ten hours. This amount of work is less

than three times the work done by a single heart, beating day and night for 24 hours: thus the hearts of three old women sitting beside the fire, alternately spinning and sleeping, do more work than can be done in a day by the youngest and strongest "navvy."

2. If an eight-oar boat be propelled through the water at the rate of one knot in seven minutes, the resistance offered by the water may be estimated at 81·36 lbs. by calculation, or at 74·15 lbs. by actual observation. From this result, and from the fact that 575 ounces of muscle are employed by each of the eight oarsmen, we can calculate that 15 foot-pounds of work are expended by each ounce of muscle during each minute of work.

No labor that we can undertake is regarded as more severe than that of the muscles employed during a boat-race; and yet this labor, severe as it is, is only three-fourths of that exerted day and night during life by each of our hearts.

The average weight of the human heart, which increases with age (for obvious reasons), may be estimated from the following tables:

	Average oz.
1. Meckel.....	10·0
2. Cruveilhier.....	7·5
3. Bouilland.....	8·4
4. Lobstein.....	9·5
5. Boyd (æt. 30—40).....	10·4
6. Boyd (æt. 40—50).....	10·5
Mean.....	9·39

From this weight, and the work done by the heart in one day (124 foot-tons), we can calculate the work done by each ounce of the heart in one minute, as follows:

Work done by the human heart, in foot-pounds per ounce per minute, $\frac{124 \cdot 208 \times 2240}{9 \cdot 39 \times 24 \times 60} = 20 \cdot 576$ foot-pounds.

This amount of work exceeds the work done by the muscles during a boat-race in the proportion of 20 to 15.

3. There is yet another mode of stating the wonderful energy of the human heart. Let us suppose that the heart expends its entire force in lifting its own weight vertically; then the total height through which it could lift itself in one

hour is thus found, by reducing the daily work done in foot-tons (124'208) to the hourly work done in foot-ounces, and dividing the result by the weight of the heart in ounces:

Height through which the human heart could raise its own weight in one hour $= \frac{124'208 \times 2240 \times 16}{24 \times 9'39} = 1,9754 \text{ ft.}$

An active pedestrian can climb from Zermatt to the top of Mont Rosa, 9,000 feet, in nine hours; or can lift his own body at the rate of 1,000 feet per hour, which is only one-twentieth part of the energy of the heart.

When the railway was constructed from Trieste to Vienna, a prize was offered for the locomotive Alp engine that could lift its own weight through the greatest height in one hour. The prize locomotive was the "Bavaria," which lifted herself through 2,700 feet in one hour; the greatest feat as yet accomplished on steep gradients. This result, remarkable as it is, reaches only one-eighth part of the energy of the human heart.

From whatever mechanical point of view, therefore, we regard the human heart, it is entitled to be considered as the most wonderful mechanism. Its energy equals one-third of the total daily force of all the muscles of a strong man; it exceeds by one-third the labor of the muscles in a boat-race, estimated by equal weights of muscle; and it is twenty times the force of the muscles used in climbing the mountain, and eight times the force of the most powerful engine invented as yet by the art of man.—*Nature*.

SAMUEL HAUGHTON.

THE VALUE OF A COMMA.—A sharp wheat-buyer in Solano county, California, seeing quotations slightly advanced, telegraphed to his principal to learn if he should buy at quotations. The answer came—"No price too high!" On the strength of the omission of the comma, he bought 200 tons, which he was obliged to sell at a loss of \$1 per ton. A comma after "No" would have saved that loss. So much for punctuation.

OUR SCHOOL HOUSES.

OUR school houses may be divided into three classes—good, medium, and poor. Those belonging to the first class have been built not so much with regard to expense as to the wants of the school. Some of these first-class houses have been built at a comparatively small cost. It is not necessary to a house of this kind that it be erected at an extravagant outlay of money. Adaptation to the purposes for which it is built should be the guiding principle, and if the wants of the school can be properly provided for at a reasonable figure, it is certainly better than to rush into extravagance. The locality in which the house is built very frequently will determine the character of the structure.

In some of our rural districts good school houses are met with—houses of the proper capacity, well built, neatly painted, furnished with suitable desks and settees, black-boards, maps, etc., properly heated and ventilated, and with sufficient playground enclosed and improved in a creditable manner. Such a condition of things can be had in some localities for perhaps a thousand dollars, and how can a thousand dollars be more properly applied? A house answering the purposes of a city or a large town equally as well would cost several thousands of dollars, and it is an evidence of the friendliness with which our free school system is regarded that we have common school houses that have cost fifteen, twenty, thirty, and even one hundred thousand dollars. First-class houses, whether in city or country, are an exception, and not the rule.

Medium school houses are more numerous. These are comparatively comfortable, but not furnished with many of the appliances to successful teaching. They are generally not well ventilated; sometimes not well seated; the school grounds are sometimes not enclosed, or properly improved. Perhaps school houses of this class are the rule, while good and poor houses are the exceptions.

Still, poor school-houses are by far too numerous. Many of them are the relics of other times; fossils that, like the ichthyic remains which Hugh Miller loved to describe,

speak of ages past. Some of these are the little log structures that mark the transition era from the state of nature to a condition of civilization, and as such are doubtless invested with a peculiar interest for those who revel in the records of our early history. The little log school house with windows eight by ten, standing, as it generally does, on some tract so utterly barren, rocky, and useless that neither the hand of progress nor of avarice has been stretched forth to molest its

“ Ancient, solitary reign,”

may serve admirably well to remind the rural Monkbains of the days of block houses and Indian warfare; but it certainly does not reflect much credit upon the present generation to retain and use it for the purposes of a school house. Not only these primitive log structures, but some of those buildings of a more recent origin and pretentious appearance, by reason of their bad location and the utter absence of every convenience, are totally unfit for the purposes for which they were erected.

I have seen school houses that seemed to have been built with a studious disregard for every quality which a school house should have. They are small, poorly lighted, poorly heated, with no means of ventilation, with seats and desks uncomfortable, and in some cases positively injurious, without playgrounds, without shade trees, without outhouses. They have no maps, no charts, and frequently no blackboard, or but a miserable apology for one, and the whole room is so gloomy and unattractive that the teacher might well sing with Hood,

“ That shattered roof, and this naked floor,
A table—a broken chair—
And a wall so blank, my shadow I thank
For sometimes falling there !”

This picture is not overwrought. It falls far below the reality. That ghastly room at Dotheboye Hall, where the quaking urchins that Fate had consigned to the care of Wackford Square sat at their cheerless tasks, has many a counterpart among those buildings known among us as school houses. How can we expect children to develop in moral,

intellectual, and physical health, strength and beauty, surrounded by such untoward influences? The school house, of all places after home, should be made attractive and pleasing. When the house has been built, it certainly will not cost much more to finish and furnish it in such a manner as will delight the eye, instruct the mind and heart, and preserve the health, strength, animation, and buoyancy of the young.

T. J. CHAPMAN.

"AND" AFTER A PERIOD.

S. W. W., in the MONTHLY for May, either innocently misapprehends or purposely misconstrues my remarks upon "the misuse of the word 'And'" in a previous number.

A reader of ordinary candor and discrimination cannot fail to perceive at once that I am not discussing *conjunctions* as a *part of speech*, for I clearly and purposely specify the word "And" in its proper office as a copulative conjunction, and I confine myself to the consideration of the frequent misuse of *that one word*, making no reference whatever to any other, whether of the same part of speech or not. But "W.," ignoring this fundamental fact, immediately leaps over the boundaries of the subject proposed, and hurries away to gather up all the other conjunctions and lug them into the same restricted category, not appearing to be aware of his utter failure to crowd a dozen words into a space already occupied and completely filled by *one*. As well might one talk about the moon and stars because the word conjunction is often used in speaking of their motions, as about "but," "nor," "either," or any other irrelevant subject while discussing the misuse of "*and*."

If "W." desires to write a dissertation on the general subject of conjunctions of all classes, let him say so, and then "stick to it." But if he only intends to discuss the use or misuse of a *particular one*, let him name it, and then confine himself to *that*, and we shall know where to find him and what he means. This is all I proposed or attempted to do;

and, *in so doing*, could not possibly have proved too much nor too little in reference to other words which were necessarily excluded from consideration by the limitations of the subject itself as announced in the title. I did not deny, and therefore impliedly admitted, that *other* conjunctions are with great propriety often used after a period. This is especially true of the disjunctives. "W." does not seem to be aware that there are two classes of conjunctions with almost opposite meanings in many cases, for he jumbles them together, to be all treated alike, irrespective of meaning.

Let us now examine that "sophistical argument" about "the period." A period indicates much more than a mere "verbal completion of a sentence." It has, or should have, reference to the *meaning* of sentences. That well-constructed sentences have *sense* as well as words to be affected by punctuation does not seem to have occurred to "W." in this connection.

Let us go to the root of the matter, and ask, What is a sentence? Prof. Andrews, in his "First Latin Book," gives the neatest, most concise, and beautiful definition that I know of in the English language. It is "a thought expressed in words." Thought is the primary element, words a secondary. A continuous discourse is composed not only of words, but of thoughts also, following each other in a connection more or less intimate, which is indicated by a judicious use of the various punctuation marks. These, when understood and observed, are great helps to the reader. A *good* reader will make a slight pause at a comma, one more distinct at a semicolon, one still more marked at a colon, and at a period will make a still longer rest, and always let his voice fall as he does not at any of the others.

As the others are only partial pauses or stops, what shall we call this, which so differs from them? *Properly*, and not "loosely," a "*full stop*," whether it occurs in the middle or end of the discourse. It is the same point doing the same duty, and having the same effect wherever used. Its office being definite and fixed, we always know just what it means. In logical discourse, or any other that has clearness, force and point, each thought, or sentence as such, is complete in itself, and this completeness is indicated by the

period; completeness, however, is not synonymous with independence. A treatise of any length necessarily contains many successive thoughts or sentences, each more or less dependent upon the other in bringing out the *whole subject*, which, as a whole, is not complete until the end is reached. This palpable distinction between a complete sentence and a complete discourse "W." fails to see, and hence the absurd idea that, however long the discourse, there is properly but one "full stop," and that "at the end," where it is entirely unnecessary, because the reader *MUST THERE STOP* at *any rate*, without a period or any other mark to tell him that he is through. Again, because of the aforesaid partial connection and dependence of complete sentences necessary to intelligent discourse, "W." argues that "and" may be used after a period; a conclusion that does not follow by any means.

Now, as to "the sense," "W." asks, "And why not begin a sentence with 'and,' if the sense justifies it?"—giving us a rare gem of elegance in style by placing a period between *two* "ands." Of course, if one is good, two must be better. The sophistry of this question is in taking for granted that the *sense does* justify it, which I deny, and which "W." cannot prove. To be justified by the inadvertance or carelessness of any number of our best writers is one thing, but to be justified by the "*sense*" is quite a different thing, which difference "W." again utterly fails to see. The sense very seldom justifies, and still more seldom if ever requires, the use of "and" after a period, as can be easily shown. The very extracts which "W." makes from Steele, Addison, and Junius to support his position would be all decidedly improved by striking out the "and." The extract from Macaulay would be much improved by either striking out the "and," or more perhaps by leaving it, and converting the period into a comma, which would give the otherwise useless "and" a chance to do its appropriate duty as a connective. I am greatly obliged to "W." for that extract, elegant even with its blemish, and I endorse it fully, for nothing could be more to the point on this subject. It appears as though Macaulay had noticed this thing, and was writing one of his strong and beautiful essays on "the misuse of And."

I would now call special attention to a simple and almost infallible test. Take any good writer you please, the beauty of whose style is marred by this blemish, and as you read, pencil in hand, see how it improves both sense and diction often either to strike out the useless "and," or, leaving it, convert the preceding period into a comma or other pause as the connection may require. In every instance it will be found that either the *period* or the *and* can be spared with evident advantage. It is sometimes surprising to see what an improvement this thoughtful little change will make. It is a good rule worthy to be kept in mind, never to use superfluous words, nor use two words where one will do as well; anything more is redundant verbiage. *Conciseness* is one of the most important elements of power in effective writing or speaking.

I freely acknowledge my utter inability to see any connection between "W.'s" long extract from Lindley Murray and the subject now under consideration, which is simply and only "*And after a period.*" As "W." prudently shrinks from the task of showing *when* and *how* the application lies, his reader can reap no benefit from it.

Although "W." "lives in a glass house," he invites the returning of the compliment of "displaying an ignorance of one of the most simple and obvious principles of grammar and punctuation." In reciprocating the favor, I will not shoot off at a tangent from the subject into an English fog, but will show just *where* and *how* he displays *his* ignorance. In his first paragraph he exhibits an entire "ignorance of the simple and obvious principle of good grammar," that "not" or "neither" should be followed by "*nor*" rather than by "*or*." The word "*or*" implies an alternative or a choice, as *this* or *that*, or the *other*. "*Nor*" *rejects all alike*—as neither *this*, nor *that*, nor the *other*. If this is what "W." means, he has not only an ungrammatical, but an "absurd" way of expressing it. However, he seems to think it "sensible and worthy of consideration," for he insists upon it to the last, ending his rambling criticism by repeating his grand "display" of grammatical accuracy in the use of "*or*," in place of "*nor*." It is easy to make a cheap show of learning by mentioning great names and copying numer-

ous learned extracts, but it is not so easy to so master even "simple and obvious principles" as to be able to show just *where* and *how* they apply, nor to select a clear and definite subject, and while discussing *it* to keep from straying off "loosely" and talking about everything else.

We have here, however, only another illustration of how easy and common it is for the sharpest critics and best writers to blunder through haste or thoughtlessness.

B.

THE SOCIETY ON THE STANISLAUS.

THE following gem, which we propose to add to the specimens of "scientific poetry" published from time to time in our columns, has been going the rounds for some time anonymously. It is from the graceful and masterly hand of F. Bret Harte, editor of the *Overland Monthly*, and author of the best sketches of California life and manners that have ever made their appearance. Such trifles as this show but a single side of his accomplishments. It is in "The Luck of Roaring Camp," "The Outcasts of Poker Flat," and other prose poems, full of humor, pathos, and exquisite description, that his genius has most delightfully announced itself—unless, indeed, the palm be given to the book notices of the *Overland*, which manifest a subtle intuition of criticism, and a force of satire (where satire is called for) that are not excelled in contemporary literature. But we hasten to reproduce—

THE SOCIETY UPON THE STANISLAUS.

I reside at Table Mountain, and my name is Truthful James ;
I am not up to small deceit, or any sinful games ;
And I'll tell in simple language what I know about the row
That broke up our society upon the Stanislaus.

But first I would remark that it is not a proper plan
For any scientific gent to whale his fellow-man,
And, if a member don't agree with his peculiar whim,
To lay for that same member for to "put a head" on him.

Now nothing could be finer or more beautiful to see
Than the first six months' proceedings of that same society,
Till Brown of Calaveras brought a lot of fossil bones,
That he found within the tunnel near the tenement of Jones.

Then Brown he read a paper, and he reconstructed there
From those same bones, an animal, that was extremely rare ;
And Jones then asked the Chair for a suspension of the rules,
Till he could prove that those same bones were one of his lost
mules.

Then Brown he smiled a bitter smile, and said his greatest fault
Was that he had been trespassing on Jones' family vault ;
He was a most sarcastic man, this quiet Mr. Brown,
And on several occasions he had cleaned out the town.

Now I hold it is not decent for a scientific gent
To say another is an ass—at least to all intent ;
Nor should the individual who happens to be meant,
Reply by heaving rocks at him to any great extent.

Then Abner Dean, of Angel's, raised a point of order, when
A chunk of old red sandstone took him in the abdomen :
He smiled a kind of sickly smile, and curled up on the floor,
And the subsequent proceedings interested him no more.

Then, in less time than I write it, every member did engage
In a warfare with the remnants of a palaeozoic age,
And the way they heaved those fossils in their anger was a sin,
And the skull of an old mammoth caved the head of Thompson in.

And this is all I have to say of these improper games,
For I live at Table Mountain, and my name is Truthful James ;
And I've told in simple language what I know about the row
That broke up our society upon the Stanislaus.

—*Mining Journal.*

EDUCATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE SUMMER EDUCATIONAL MEETINGS.

THE NEW YORK STATE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION will hold its Twenty-fifth Annual Meeting at SYRACUSE on the 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th of July. The selection of the place of meeting this year seems eminently appropriate; because it was at Syracuse, at a general convention of teachers assembled for that purpose, on the 30th day of July, 1845, that this Association was organized. It is the oldest association of its kind in this country, and its career from the first has been one of continued prosperity and usefulness. A programme of the exercises has not yet reached us. A meeting of more than usual interest is anticipated.

In addition to the usual business, there are to be appropriate exercises in celebration of this its TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY. At the meeting of 1869 the ex-Presidents of the Association were appointed a committee to make the necessary arrangements. The first President (Prof. Ches-

ter Dewey), and the second (Prof. Joseph McKean) are dead. Consequently the third President (Hon. S. B. Woolworth, of Albany,) is the senior of the Presidents now living. Eighteen in all still survive, and constitute the committee referred to.¹

THE NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS AND CITY SUPERINTENDENTS has convened, for some years, at the same time and place with the STATE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, and we assume that it will so convene this year, though we have had no very clear announcement of the fact.

THE CONVOCATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK will celebrate its next anniversary in the capitol at Albany on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th days of August. The programme will be duly announced.

THE Second Annual Session of the AMERICAN PHILOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION will be held in Rochester, N. Y., commencing July 26th. All persons intending to be present are requested to send notice to that effect, not later than by July 1st, to the Secretary of the Association (Prof. George F. Comfort, Franklin Square, New York City), or to the Secretary of the Local Committee (Prof. A. H. Mixer, Rochester, N. Y.) In accordance with Sec. 1 of Art. V. of the Constitution, persons proposing to read papers before the Association are requested to send copies of the papers to the Secretary of the Association not later than by July 15th.

THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE will hold its Eighteenth Annual Meeting at

¹ We are informed that no meeting of this committee has yet been called. It is reported, however, that the *past* President, the veteran writer of reports for the Board of Education for the City of Brooklyn, has assumed the chairmanship of the committee, and has, without calling a meeting of his associates, decided upon "a part of the exercises," announced that "further particulars will be given in connection with the programme for the Annual Meeting," and "respectfully requests" "anything of interest in relation to the Association, or its officers and members, from its organization to the present," to be sent to him.

Were the evidence less than a circular signed by himself, we should believe that there must be some mistake, because of his reputation as a modest man, always avoiding unnecessary notoriety; and because of his character as a gentleman, ready to respect the wishes of his equals and superiors, unwilling to assume the sole responsibility of directing affairs over which they rightly have, at least, equal control.

TROY, commencing August 17th. The enterprise, for which the Trojans are famous, has already found expression in the appointment of committees of prominent citizens, who are making liberal arrangements for its entertainment. THE ALBANY INSTITUTE, an ancient but active literary and scientific organization, has appointed a committee to invite the Association to the Capital City some time during its convention at Troy, and to provide for a suitable reception.

THE NATIONAL TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION will convene in Cleveland, Ohio, on the 17th, 18th, and 19th of August. Among the papers promised, we notice the following: "National University," by Dr. J. W. Hoyt; "Decimal System of Weights and Measures," by James B. Thompson, LL.D.; "The Proper Work of a Primary School," by Prof. E. A. Sheldon; "Music in its Relations to Common School Education," by Prof. Eben Tourjee; "The Motives and Means which should be made Prominent in School Discipline and Instruction," by Prof. George A. Chase; "The Relation of the National Government to Public Education," by Gen. John Eaton, Jun.; "The Claims of English Grammar in Common Schools," by J. S. Baker; "The Duty of the State with Reference to Higher Education," by Hon. A. S. Kissell; "The Use and Abuse of Text-books in Schools," by Z. G. Wilson; "Free Common Schools, what they can do for a State," by Hon. F. A. Sawyer; "An Address by President Charles W. Elliott." Special arrangements for railroad tickets are expected to be made, and will be duly announced. The efficient President of the Association, Daniel B. Hagar, is active in developing every plan possible for the profit of the Association.

THE AMERICAN NORMAL SCHOOL ASSOCIATION is to be in session at the same place, August 15th and 16th. Addresses will be delivered by the President, John Ogden, William F. Phelps, Richard Edwards, George B. Loomis, J. L. Pickard, A. G. Boyden, J. W. Dickinson, S. H. White, and George M. Gage. A paper on "The Place and Value of Object Lessons" is promised by Miss Delia A. Lathrop; and one on "The Treatment of Dunces," by Miss Fanny M. Jackson. This meeting promises to be a good one.

THE NATIONAL SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS' ASSOCIATION will hold a business meeting at Cleveland, O., on the afternoon of August 16th. No programme will be issued.

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INSTRUCTION will hold its Forty-first Annual Session in Worcester, Mass., on the 26th, 27th, and 28th of July.

THE action of the Publishers' Board of Trade will probably make the absence of the Book Agents a marked feature of the Educational Meetings of this summer. How this may effect the liveliness and interest of the several conventions remains to be seen.

MISCELLANEA.

RUTGERS COLLEGE, New Brunswick, N. J., celebrated its centennial anniversary June 21st. This college is having most gratifying prosperity. Liberal sums have been recently subscribed for important endowments.

BROWN UNIVERSITY had its 102nd commencement on the 29th of June.

RUSSIA has nine Universities, all under the care of the Government. The largest, that of Moscow, has 75 professors and 1,600 students.

PROF. W. B. GRAVES, late of Phillips Academy, Andover, has entered upon his duties as Professor of Natural Sciences in Marietta College, Ohio.

PROF. B. F. TWEED, of St. Louis, formerly of Tufts College, succeeds Rev. J. H. Twombly as Superintendent of Schools in Charlestown, Mass.

ACCORDING to the recent report of Abner J. Phipps, Agent of the Mass. Board of Education, there are now 175 high schools in the State, two of which are under the management of ladies. The amount expended last year in erecting school-houses was \$1,037,388.

FIVE Japanese noblemen have recently entered Rutgers College, New Brunswick, N. J.; and two Siberians have been admitted to Cornell University.

PROF. G. F. COMFORT has resigned his chair at Princeton, to devote himself to the preparation of his text-books.

PROF. GUSTAVUS FISCHER is about to publish, through Mr. Steiger, the well-known German publisher of New York, a grammar to aid Germans in mastering the English. He will deserve no mercy from the reviewers.

THE Professor of International Law in the University of Oxford is about to publish a work, entitled *Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War*. On this subject we are inclined to say *jam satis*.

PROF. LIEBIG has received the Albert medal from the Society of Arts, Trade, and Manufacture of Great Britain. This is considered a great distinction, as only one such medal is awarded annually, and this is the first that has been awarded to a German.

THE poet Whittier has been elected a trustee, and Prof. Elliott Blake of Cornell University, Hazard Professor of Physics, of Brown University.

GEN. JOSEPH E. JOHNSON has accepted the Presidency of Nashville University, and friends of the University have raised \$25,000 by subscription to pay his salary during the next five years.

COL. HOMER B. SPRAGUE, Professor of Rhetoric, etc., in Cornell University, has been elected Principal of Adelphi Academy, Brooklyn, N. Y., at a salary of \$6,000 per an.

WHEN at college, Surtees was waiting on the Dean on business, and, feeling cold, stirred the fire. "Pray, Mr. Surtees," said the great man, "do you think that any other undergraduate in this college would have taken that liberty?" "Yes, Mr. Dean," was the reply; "any one as cool as I am!"

MR. WM. H. APPLETON, the publisher, has given \$10,000 to an orphan institution at Macon, Ga.

HARPER & BROTHERS employ forty-five steam presses, of which thirty-four are book presses. They used last year \$600,000 worth of paper.

IVISON, BLAKEMAN, TAYLOR & Co., the well-known Educational publishers, have removed to a new and elegant store, 138 and 140 Grand street, N. Y. The fact that they manufacture each day of the year 12,000 volumes of their books will enable one to appreciate the immensity of their business.

AT a recent examination of Teachers in Rhode Island (probably in the town of Foster), the "committeeman" grew

somewhat impatient, and exclaimed, "Miss Potter, we know very well that A, B, C, and D are *vowels*, but we must insist that you explain *why* these letters are vowels."

JOHN H. FRENCH, LL.D., of Albany, N. Y., has been elected Secretary of the Vermont Board of Education—an office equivalent to that of "State Superintendent of Public Instruction." Dr. French is well known as a teacher and author, as well as a conductor of Teachers' Institutes. In this latter capacity he has done veteran service, and has no superior. Vermont has done well to secure him.

PROF. JAS. JOHONNOT has recently been holding Teachers' Institutes in Westchester and Dutchess Counties with good success. Besides his work in New York, this gentleman has conducted several series of Institutes in other States: Vermont, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.

PROF. D. H. CRUTTENDEN has been holding Teachers' Institutes in Maine. We learn that the remarks concerning Prof. C.'s "inevitable discourse" "On Language," at Ithaca, last year, did that gentleman injustice. His address was a new one, prepared for the occasion, and candid hearers have pronounced it an excellent address. It is not easy to find a more earnest educational worker than D. H. Cruttenden.

THE DELTA PHI FRATERNITY held a general Convention at Schenectady, N. Y., June 15th, 16th and 17th. Delegates were present from all parts of the United States.

CURRENT PUBLICATIONS.

A BOOK is offered by Mr. Randall "for the use of Common Schools, Academies, Normal and High Schools, and other Seminaries of Instruction," "in the confident hope that the work may be found worthy of adoption;" and notwithstanding occasional inaccuracies of expression (as in the instance above quoted—"seminaries of instruction," in place of *seminaries of learning*), it may be found desirable to adopt it. Yet it should be used only in default of a better book, and used with great care. For while the book is the fruit of a praiseworthy attempt, it is but gnarly fruit, or, at the best, insipid.

The author has given what seems to be a truthful record of the changes which took place in the administration of the government of New Amsterdam and New York, from the days of the Iroquois, through the period of the Knickerbockers, the British Colonial era, the time of the Confederation, and that of the United

1 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. By S. S. RANDALL. New York: J. B. Ford & Co. 370 pages, price \$1 75.

States, to January, 1870, together with brief, but sufficiently full, mention of the battles of the old French war, the war of the Revolution, and that of 1812. And for the various terms, between the time of the adoption of the State Constitution and the present year, he has given with conscientious, but we suggest most unnecessary, minuteness the names not only of President and Vice-President, Governor and Lieutenant-Governor elect, with their respective majorities, but also of Senator and Secretary, Comptroller and Attorney-General, Judge and Committeeman.

Now all this, we submit, is a little husky. All such information may be desirable to have, and some of it perhaps should be printed in school-books. But, in dealing with the growth from infancy of this great Commonwealth, we want something more than this. We want to be made better acquainted with the early settlers; we want to know something of the modes of life, the habits, and the aspirations of the mingling races; to follow them, as, spreading outward from Manhattan Island over the broad territory of the State, they explored and subdued it. We want to know more of the changes which took place among the people, and not so exclusively those which were made in the Executive Chamber.

These things, it seems to us, should be traced in a history of the State, which is intended to aid in the formation of good citizens, and of these things, though Mr. Randall has said something, he has said very little.

TEACHERS' INSTITUTES, within the last few years, have become powerful auxiliaries to the cause of education. That they will accomplish more and more good is unquestioned. Systematic instruction will be more generally introduced at these gatherings, and Teachers will thereby be the greater gainers. Mr. COLE's new book² is a decided step in the right direction. Hitherto no one work has been obtainable to afford the complete variety of exercises, in different grades and styles, required in presenting to Teachers the important subject: "How to Teach Reading."

Part I. contains practical directions to primary Teachers, followed by exercises from the Primer and First and Second Readers. Part II. continues the directions, and contains a Manual of Articulation for drill purposes, and a series of reading lessons from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Readers. Part III. is a complete Reader for advanced classes, and furnishes those who desire to pursue the study of Elocution without a master, with the necessary instructions and exercises for self-training. Part IV. instructs those who lack experience in such organizations, to call the teachers of the county together, and to form and conduct a successful Institute.

The author has given us a novel and very useful book; and its publishers, too, have done their part exceedingly well.

THE ECLECTIC EDUCATIONAL SERIES, by MESSRS. WILSON, HINKLE & Co., of Cincinnati, Ohio, has recently had three important volumes added to its already extended list. I. A treatise on GEOMETRY and TRIGONOMETRY, for colleges, schools, and private students, written for the mathematical course of Dr. Joseph Ray, by Eli T. Tappan, professor of mathematics in Ohio University. II. A treatise on ANALYTIC GEOMETRY, especially as applied to the properties of Conics,

² THE INSTITUTE READER AND NORMAL CLASS-BOOK, for the use of Teachers' Institutes and Normal Schools, and for Self-training in the Art of Reading. By WILLIAM H. COLE. 360 pages, 12mo., price \$1 25. Cincinnati: Wilson, Hinkle & Co.

including the modern methods of abridged notation, written for Dr. Ray's mathematical course by George W. Howison, professor in Washington University. III. *THE ELEMENTS OF ASTRONOMY*, for Ray's course, by Selim H. Peabody, teacher of the natural sciences in the Chicago High School.

MESSRS. HARPER & BROTHERS, Franklin Square, New York, have, as usual, a large list of new books for the month. I. *THE LIFE OF BISMARCK*, private and political, with descriptive notes of his ancestry, by JOHN GEORGE LOUIS HESSEKIEL, translated and edited, with an introduction, explanatory notes, and appendices, by KENNETH R. H. MACKENZIE, F. A. S. L. It has an excellent portrait, and upwards of one hundred illustrations, by Diez, Grimm, Pietsch, and others. 491 pages. II. *CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY*; or, *The Relation between Spontaneous and Reflective Thought in Greece and the Positive Teaching of Christ and His Apostles*. By B. F. CROCKER, D. D., professor of moral and mental philosophy in the University of Michigan. 532 pages. III. *Memoir of the REV. JOHN SCUDDER, M. D.*, thirty-six years a missionary in India. By Rev. J. B. WATERBURY, D. D. With a portrait of Dr. Scudder and his Wife. 308 pages. IV. *MISS VAN KORTLAND, a Novel*. By the Author of "My Daughter Elinor." Paper covers, 180 pages, price \$1 00. V. *BAFFLED*; or, *Michael Brand's Wrong*. By JULIA GODDARD. Illustrated. Paper covers, 160 pages, price 75c. VI. *BENEATH THE WHEELS, a Romance*. By the Author of "Olive Varcol." Paper covers, 173 pages, price 50c.

J. B. LIPPINCOTT & Co., of Philadelphia, have published a treatise on *ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY*, with appendices, containing a collection of exercises for students and an introduction to modern geometry. By WILLIAM CHAUVENET, LL. D., professor of mathematics and astronomy in Washington University.

CHARLES SCRIBNER & Co., New York, have added three new volumes to their illustrated *LIBRARY OF WONDERS*. Vol. XI. *THE WONDERS OF ITALIAN ART*. By LOUIS VIARDOT. With twenty-eight illustrations. 1 vol. 12mo., 344 pages. Price \$1 50. XII. *WONDERS OF THE HUMAN BODY*. Translated from the French of A. PILEUR. With forty-five illustrations, and a colored frontispiece. 1 vol. 12mo., 256 pages. Price \$1 50. XIII. *THE WONDERS OF ARCHITECTURE*. Translated from the French of Lefevre. By R. DONALD. With an additional Chapter on our English Architecture. 1 vol. 12mo., 264 pages, with sixty illustrations. Price \$1 50. Also several other volumes of standard literature, which will be more fully noticed in our next.

IN SPAIN AND A VISIT TO PORTUGAL, by HAUS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, is a very entertaining and instructive book from the press of Messrs. HURD & HOUGHTON, New York.

TALKS TO MY PATIENTS; Hints on Getting Well and Keeping Well. By Mrs. R. B. GLEASON, M. D. 228 pages. New York: WOOD & HOLBROOK.

A Treatise on the GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, containing a complete system of analysis and parsing, progressively arranged, by T. R. VICKROY, A. M., President of Lebanon Valley College. Philadelphia: J. A. BANCROFT & Co.

THE BIBLE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS. The Addresses of Rev. A. D. MAYO and Rev. THOS. VICKERS, of Cincinnati. 32mo., 226 pages, paper covers. Price 25c. This book is Vol. VI. of the *LIBRARY OF EDUCATION*. New York: J. W. SCHERMERHORN & Co.

PROF. WHITNEY'S COMPENDIOUS GERMAN GRAMMAR.¹

(Concluded from the June Number.)

PAGE 58 (§ 159, 5), we read the remark :

Mein ic. used predicatively, assert ownership pure and simple. Thus: *der Hut ist mein*; the hat belongs to me, and to no one else. *Meiner*, *der meine* and *der meinige* are wholly equivalent expressions, combining with the idea of property an implication of the character of the thing owned. Thus: *er ist meiner* etc.; it is my hat, and no one's else. *Der meinige* etc., are most common in colloquial use; *der meine* etc., are preferred in higher styles.

These statements are in many respects incorrect. The difference between the inflected and uninflected possessive forms cannot be expressed in terms so vague, out of which the student may either make everything or nothing, and which evidently miss the main point.¹ Nor do the two examples, alleged by the author, serve in the least to explain what he means. One of the examples is, moreover, grammatically incorrect; for we cannot say: *er (der Hut) ist meiner*.² Nor are *meiner*, *der meinige* and *der meine* "wholly equivalent expressions."³ Nor is the author correct when he says that *der meinige* etc., are most common in colloquial, and *der meine* etc., in higher style.⁴

In the paradigm of the interrogative pronoun *was* (page 63), the genitive is given in brackets, as "[*weß*]," with the remark that it is hardly met with except in the compounds, *weßwegen*, *weßhalb*.⁵ But the regular genitive *weßsen* is entirely omitted.⁶ In the same section we are informed that *was* has no dative, and that if it is governed by prepositions, prepositional adverbs with *wo* must be substituted. But we are not informed by what means we supply the dative of *was* if no prepositions are admissible.⁷

On page 76, No. 5, *a*, we read the rule, that after nouns denoting measure, quantity, etc., the substantive following is usually put neither in the genitive (*partitive genitive*), nor in the dative with *von* "of," but stands "as if in apposition" with the other. That this is not so, the author might have seen from phrases like the following: *mit einer Schwadron Reiter*, *mit einer Menge Kinder*, *aus zwei Meilen Rom*, in which the nouns *Reiter*, *Kinder*, *Rom*, if they were in apposition, would agree with their governing nouns in the dative case. There can be hardly any doubt that what the author calls nouns, "as if in apposition," are nothing but former genitives (in Old German they have their full inflections) that have lost their inflectional endings. If the author does not agree with this opinion, although we think it is now generally adopted, he ought to have said, at least, that substantives following nouns of quantity, etc., are indeclinable; for representing these forms as "appositions" will mislead the student. We have missed in this section the peculiar construction of substantives connected with the nouns

¹ The two cases differ by the difference of their predicates. The uninflected *mein* etc., as a predicate, always means *my*, etc., *property*; as: *Die Kraft und die Herrlichkeit ist Dein*. Lord's Prayer. — *Die Herzen von Genua sind mein*. Schiller, *Die Rauber* 2, 19. — *Das Thomasthor ist unser*. Ib. 178. The inflected forms *der meinige* etc., are not themselves the predicates, but its attributes, and the predicate proper is here always a noun understood, which may or may not be the subject. These forms are principally used to compare things of different owners. Thus the examples alleged by the author (§ 159, 4): *Sein Richterstuhl ist nicht der meine* (Lessing, *Rathen* 3, 7), which does not mean "his judgment-seat does not belong to me," but "His judgment-seat and mine are not the same." Thus: *Meine Begriffe sind nicht ganz die Ihrigen*. Schiller, *Kab. u. L.* 1, 7, and innumerable other passages.

² See Heyse, page 120, No. 4.

³ Thus: We cannot change: *Im Vaterland willst du die meine werden* (Schiller, *Teil* 87) into: *willst du meine werden*; nor: *Ich habe das Meinige gethan* into, *ich habe Meines gethan*.

⁴ Neither *der meinige* nor *der meine* are quite colloquial, except in proverbs, in which the forms *der meine* etc., are decidedly more frequent; as: *Stich Jedem das Seine*. In colloquial style, the forms *meiner* etc., are more usual; while in higher style, the forms *der meinige* etc., and *der meine* are of an equal frequency. According to Grimm (*Lexicon* s. v. *mein*), the forms *der meinige* are even more usual than the others.

⁵ As: *Sprecht, weissen soll man sich zu euch verstehen?* Schiller, *Teil*, p. 130. *Doch weissen rühmen wir uns von dem Sohne?* Ib. Page 160.

⁶ For instance, in phrases like the following: "To what do you ascribe this?"

„die Fülle“ and „die Menge“, as *Reichen die Fülle*, a plenty of wheat. The explanation of this construction, as in „Der Herr tränkt die Felsen mit Wasser die Fülle, Psalms 78, 15“, would seem rather difficult for a beginner.

On page 83 (§ 225) the author says:

The use of the dative as a virtual possessive genitive, grammatically dependent on a verb, but logically qualifying a noun, has been explained above (§ 222, III, a, b).¹ RARELY, the dative is found having the same value with a noun alone:² as, *dem Riesen zur Lust*, 'for the giant's pleasure'; *er gab, ihm zu Ehren*, *manche Feste*, 'he gave many festivals in his honor.' YET MORE RARELY, it occurs with a noun in other relations usually expressed by a genitive,³ or with the aid of a preposition: as, *ein Rußer Bürgern und Bauern*, 'a model for citizens and peasants'; *Gewissheit einem neuen Bunde*, 'assurance of a new covenant.'

To this statement apply all remarks in our first article on the abstract nature of the author's rules, when he makes them mere accessories to certain principles which are neither true nor clearly stated. It would have been far preferable here, if the author had simply quoted his alleged phrases as idiomatic German constructions, similar to those which he calls „datives being virtually possessive genitives.“ For the beginner cares very little (and hardly would understand it if he did), whether such datives logically or grammatically depend on verbs or nouns. But if the beginner should succeed in grasping the author's meaning, he would feel sadly disappointed, when arriving at the alleged examples, in which just the very point is concealed by which this case is distinguished from the case treated in § 222. For the author has torn them from their connection, withholding the governing verbs, so that no one can see whether their datives depend on the verb, or on „the noun alone.“ The first of his examples is taken from Chamisso, and completely reads thus: *Sein famen die Farren dem Riesen zur Lust*, *home came the steers to the giant's joy.* The third example is taken from Goethe's *Faust*: *Der Gesang klang — Gewissheit einem neuen Bunde*, *the song sounded assurance to a new covenant.* The last is from Goethe's *Hermann and Dorothea*: *Er ist — ein Rußer Bürgern und Bauern*, *he is a pattern to citizens and peasants.* Every one reading the sentences thus will at once see that the datives contained in them, depend just as much (or as little) „grammatically“ on the verbs as those examples which he quotes § 222, III, a, b.⁴ The second example even „logically“ depends on the verb *lingen*, for which compare § 227, b, of the author's own grammar, and the sentence „*Es tönt die Glode Grabgejang*“, alleged by him at that place. That indeed his datives „*dem Riesen zc.*“ do not depend on the nouns *Lust zc.*, will be evident if we omit the preposition *zu* and consider *Lust* as a nominative. It will then appear that the words „*dem Riesen die Lust*“ stand in no grammatical connection whatever. Thus, whether the author's theory is true or not, it is certainly not upheld by his examples. When he calls phrases like „*dem Riesen zur Lust*“ a *rare* construction, he is mistaken. These constructions occur in passages literally innumerable.

Page 84 gives a theory of the accusative, at the head of which is placed the rule that all transitive verbs govern the accusative, and that transitive verbs are those that take a direct object in the accusative. The author acknowledges that this theory is „rather formal than logical“ (§ 227); why, then, use it? But he adds in the same section that the accusative is also „sometimes“ used as the object of „intransitive“ verbs, which seems clearly to prove that „verbs governing the accusative“ and „transitive verbs“ are not interchangeable terms. To what consequences the author has been led by this theory appears for instance from the fact that he calls „*es gelüftet mich*“ a *transitive* (§ 219, 4),

¹ Here the author remarks: A dative grammatically dependent on the verb takes the place of a possessive genitive qualifying a noun in the sentence: thus, *der Amme um den Hals fallen*, 'falling upon her nurse's neck'; *setzt den Mißthäter der Raib in den Schooß*, 'lay Mißthäter in the maid's lap.'

² He evidently means „grammatically dependent on a noun,“ since he opposes this to „logically qualifying a noun.“

³ What the author means by this clause, and why he has opposed this case to the former, is not clear, since the datives in both sets of examples evidently have the force of possessive genitives.

⁴ That the author makes in the example „*Der Amme um den Hals fallen*“ the dative „*der Amme*“ grammatically dependent on *fallen* (as if *fallen* governed a dative), while in the examples, mentioned above, he denies that the dative „*dem Riesen*“ grammatically depends on *heimsamen*, is more than we can understand. We beg to suggest to the author some examples which would seem to sustain his theory perhaps better than those chosen: *Nich soll ehren ein herrlicher Hügel — den Biskern und künftigen Zeiten ein Denkmäl.* Goethe, *Willems*, p. 96. — *Dir zur Ehre mißgeborde ich dir.* Platen, *Matthäe v. Bafels*, Act I.

and „es lüſtet mich“ an *intransitive* verb (§ 227, 2, c); thus *es jammert mich* is transitive, according to the author; but *es hungert mich* intransitive. He has spun out this theory still further, requiring of a transitive verb “that it must signify an action exerted by the subject upon any object *outside of itself*” (§ 283, No. 2). From this he concludes that “reflexive verbs” are *logically* intransitive, but *grammatically* transitive, and that *ich fürchte mich* (literally ‘I frighten myself’), “I am afraid,” is in idea as much intransitive as *ich zittere* ‘I tremble.’ All the advantage that a student may derive from this sterile and unsound theory would be his learning the signification of „*ich fürchte mich*.” But unfortunately the author has made here a double mistake; for *ich fürchte* never means “I frighten,” but “I fear;” and, moreover, it is now universally understood that *ich fürchte mich* is a modern corruption of *ich fürchte mir* (I fear for myself), and hence it is neither grammatically nor logically transitive.

On page 100 we have in regard to the modal auxiliaries (fönnen, wollen &c.):

When used in connection with another verb (infinitive), the infinitive is substituted for the participle in the perfect and pluperfect tenses. Thus *er hat es nicht gekonnt*, but *er hat es nicht thun können*—‘he has not been able to do it.’ This is a simple grammatical anomaly, an *original blunder of construction*, though now sanctioned by universal use.¹ It was apparently caused by the influence of the other neighboring infinitive, which ‘attracted’ the auxiliary into a correspondence of form with itself.

This is the former opinion of the grammarians on the subject, which, however, has been abandoned since Grimm (Gramm. 4, 167 foll.) has satisfactorily explained the cause of the seeming irregularity. For our language offers no analogy whatever of an attraction of this kind, and it would, moreover, be inexplicable that the attraction should have operated on the modal auxiliaries and a few other verbs only, and not on *every* verb construed with an infinitive. Grimm shows that the verbs whose participles are now considered as infinitives, in Old German belonged to those classes of the strong conjugation which did not change the radical vowel in the participle, and that they all rejected the augment, so that their participles had exactly the same forms as their infinitives (as for instance the English verb *to come*, and a majority of the strong verbs in modern German, if they would be stripped of their augments). When, in later periods of the language, these verbs assumed the “weak” conjugation, the old infinitive form of the participle was retained in certain constructions, because the people had become accustomed to the construction as to a formula. Thus these so called infinitives are in fact participles that have retained their ancient forms (only modified by the general law of vowel-changes), and it is rather *our* blunder if we consider them as infinitives, than an *original* blunder of the language-makers, if they gave to some of their participles a form corresponding to the infinitives.

Page 100, § 251, 6 b. we read the following observation:

The same absence (of a complete conjugation of the modal auxiliaries) has led to the use of certain idiomatic and not strictly logical² constructions in English, in which the auxiliary of past time, *have*, is combined with the principal verb in the participle, instead of with the modal auxiliary; while the German more correctly combines it with the latter. Thus *he would not have done it* is not, in German, *er wollte es nicht gethan haben*, unless it signifies ‘he was not willing to have done it;’ if, as usual, it means ‘he would not have been willing to do it’ it is *er hätte es nicht thun wollen*. Thus, also he might have come (that is ‘he would have been able to come’) is *er hätte kommen können*, not *er konnte gekommen sein*.

Here the author has either misapprehended the construction in question, or he has expressed himself obscurely, it being difficult to discover his meaning. The German by no means always combines the auxiliary *to have* (or *be*) with the modal auxiliary. Both connections—that with the principal verb and that with the auxiliary, exist in German, but with different meanings. Thus *er hätte sprechen können* is different from *er könnte gesprochen haben*; *er möchte geschlafen haben* is very different from *er hätte schlafen mögen*. The examples by which he tries to illustrate his opinion are not well chosen. The first ‘he would not have done it,’ does not correspond to the German *er hätte es nicht thun wollen*,

¹ The author should have remarked that occasionally the very best authors use the participle, as Tieck, Octav., 2, 2: *Das nicht Reden unter ihm g e m u ſ ſ t*.

² We do not agree with the author in this respect. The English language is here just as strictly logical as the German in the formation of the conditional. Only, the English potential forms have often two different meanings, while the German language assigns to each of the two meanings a different form.

as the author says, but to *er würde es nicht gethan haben*, and would seem to prove exactly the contrary to what he meant to prove by it. The German *er wollte es nicht gethan haben* does not mean 'he was not willing to have done it' but 'he pretended not to have done it (he denied that he had done it).' In the same way the author is mistaken when he says that his second example 'he might have come' cannot be translated by *er konnte gekommen sein*. We unquestionably can translate the quoted English phrase in this manner; but it means something different from *er hätte kommen können*.

On page 116, speaking of the vowel-changes in the second and third persons sing. of some "strong" verbs, he says: *The a remains unchanged in schallen and schallen and sometimes in laden and mahlen*. This is an error. The vowel-change of *mahlen* is obsolete, and of *laden* very rare. Moreover, *mahlen* does not belong here at all, because it forms a weak preterit (*mahlte*), the form *muhl* being altogether obsolete. If the author reckons *mahlen* to the strong verbs on account of its participle *gemahlen*, it would have been necessary to except also the verbs *saften*, *salzen*, *spalten*, which likewise have strong participles, but do not change the *a* in the present. That *baden* and *braten* often refuse the vowel-change (although they often form strong preterites) has been entirely omitted. In § 268, 3 he mentions *erlöschen*, as changing *ö* into *i*. But so does *löschen* with all its compounds, if used intransitively (as *das Licht löschte* — not *löschte* — *aus*).

The author on page 124 has enriched the language with a new passive participle *„geliebt worden“* in the paradigm. It is true, he adds *„geliebt worden“* is used only in forming the compound tenses. But this is another mistake. For of the two participles which we find in the compound tenses of the passive, the one is that of the auxiliary (*ich bin worden*), the other that of the principal verb (*geliebt*). If *geliebt worden* were a participle of *lieben*, as he supposes, the auxiliary of the passive would not be *werden*, but *sein* (*ich bin — geliebt worden*). While he thus invents a non-existing passive participle, he leaves out the true passive participle *geliebt*, which he refers to the active voice. From this it would evidently follow that the participle *besiegt* in the phrase *„ein besiegter Feind“* (a vanquished foe) must be an active participle. But this does not disconcert the author, for in another part of his book he has introduced the following rule: *The past participle of a transitive verb has "passive meaning"* (§ 351); and this is the very reason why it should have been in the paradigm of the passive. His rule would then have been superfluous.¹ In accordance with this peculiar dogmatic tendency he gives in the paradigm of the reflexive verb a participle *„sich gefreut“*, which has no reality whatever, but is a grammatical enormity.

According to §§ 280 and 227, 3 the author would form the following startling passive constructions: *„Er wurde seinen Namen gefragt; ich wurde einen Besuch gebeten.“* It is true that he does not expressly give these sentences (the rule being left destitute of examples), but they would be correct according to the author's rules. For he says:

§ 227, 3: A few transitive verbs govern two accusatives. They are *fragen*,² *lehren*,³ *hissen*, which add to their personal object another denoting the thing to which their action relates: thus *er fragte mich manches*, 'he asked me many a thing'; *ich bitte dich nur dies*, I beg of thee only this.—§ 280, 1: Verbs which govern two accusatives (227, 3) except *lehren*, take in the passive the second accusative either as object (*fragen* &c.), or as predicate nominative (*nennen* &c.).—Examples wanting.

From these rules the passive constructions mentioned above would be clearly correct. We need not add that the second rule is erroneous, and

¹ The author seems to have been induced to consider *geübt* as an active participle by its use in the active compound tenses. But he must acknowledge (page 97 No. 4) that "I have stretched out my arms" originally means "I have my arms stretched out," which seems to make it clear, that this participle is indeed a *passive*, and assumes an active meaning only in connection with the auxiliary *haben*.

² The author ought to have remarked that this construction is not the regular one. The object for which we ask must generally be connected by a *preposition*.—³ He should have remarked that *lehren* is also construed with a *dative* of the person. The question, which of the two constructions (*accusative* or *dative*) is the correct one, is so doubtful, that it was some time ago, in consequence of a wager, submitted to *legal decision* (in the Berlin City-Court). The Court heard the testimonies of the best German scholars under oath. Their opinions were equally divided, two declaring the *dative*, and two the *accusative* to be the right case; but all agreed that either construction was sustained by our best classical authors. These opinions are published, and completely exhaust the subject. The judge, himself a German scholar, declared the matter to be so doubtful, that he could not decide the question.

that the construction of verbs governing two object-accusatives cannot be changed into a passive one.

The author's treatment of compound verbs (p. 131—140) is open to great objections. First it is neither clear nor logical. He divides the compound verbs into four classes: 1) separable compounds, 2) inseparable, 3) partly separable, partly inseparable, 4) "other" compounds. This fourth class is again subdivided into four categories: a) true compounds, b) false or loose compounds, c) denominatives, d) the compounds of *mit* and *voll*. The fourth class appears altogether arbitrary, for the author reckons among this class "verbs compounded with other adverbs than those *already mentioned*," which is certainly no principle of division at all. And indeed all of these subdivisions belong to the one or the other of his first three classes. For his "true compounds," the denominatives and those with *mit*¹ (*handhaben*, *liebfofen*, *früh-juden* &c.) all belong to the second class (inseparables); his false compounds (*hastfinfen*, *loßpreden* &c.) belong without exception to the first class (separables), and those with *voll* to the third class. Not much better is the author's treatment of the single classes. Thus he enumerates in the list of separable particles the prefixes *entzwei*, *empor*, *heim*, along with the prepositional prefixes *an*, *auf*, *durch* &c. These evidently belong to what he calls "loose or false compounds" (for inst. *loß*, *wöhl*). For there is no principal difference in the treatment of the verbs *loßgehen* and *heimgehen*. The words *mier* and *hinter* stand among the separables, while they evidently belong to the inseparables (see Grimm, II, 370 foll. Becker, p. 145. The contrary statement of Heyse, regarding *hinter*, is erroneous). The word *in* stands among the separables, but is found only in the single verb *inwohnen*, which is a mere abbreviation of *innewohnen*. This ought to have been stated in a remark to the particle *inne*, which is enumerated along with *in*.² The treatment of the whole subject is not practical enough. For in spite of the author's division into 7 classes, the student will not be able to obtain a clear idea in regard to the treatment of those compound verbs which have several prefixes (these causing the main difficulty). His treatment of those prefixes which are sometimes separable, and sometimes inseparable, is altogether perplexing. He has fallen here into the common error of most grammarians to illustrate the use of these compounds by certain verbs which in some significations are separable and in others inseparable. Nearly all of these verbs in reality exist only as *inseparables*, and their use as separables is either objectionable, or exists only in the fancy of some grammarians. The author employs for this purpose the verbs *durchbringen*, *hintergehen*, *übersehen*, *umgehen*, *unterwerfen*, *wiederholen*. Of these the verbs *hintergehen* and *unterwerfen* are no separables at all; *übersehen* as separable verb is quite unusual, and can only be used without objects. *Durchbringen* and *umgehen* are most unfortunately chosen, since they flatly contradict the author's own principle, according to which the separable verb has a literal, and the inseparable a figurative meaning, while in regard to *durchbringen* (prevail—penetrate) and *umgehen* (to associate—to go around) just the contrary is true. But the worst is that all these verbs stand, as it were, only on paper, the author not having seen fit to illustrate their usage by a solitary example, which in *this* subject obviously was the main thing. Moreover, the student should have been told that of all these "ambiguous" prefixes only *durch* is generally used in both senses (as separable or inseparable), but that the other prefixes of this category are mostly used *inseparably*; while *wieder* is used only separably, except in the word *wiederholen*. This would considerably diminish the difficulty and would be sufficient for all practical purposes.

The author's treatment of the subject is, also, *incomplete*, notwithstanding its explicitness. Thus he is anxious to show the "further" composition of compound verbs, and to teach the student which of the two prefixes is the first in time and which is of later origin; but of what use will be such knowledge to a beginner, who has yet no idea of even the simple verbs?

¹ The author says indeed that the compounds with *mit* are rarely treated as *separables*; but this is an evident mistake. We cannot say (even in poetry) *er verfißt mit* *mit* &c. Although we sometimes find *mitgeaditet*, we never find: *er aditet mit*. Becker, p. 145.

² The preposition *in* never is used as a prefix of a verb; but instead of it either *inne* (*intus*) is used, or *ein* (*intro*).

The practical question for the student is, whether and how two or more prefixes may be separated, and to find this out, very few, if any, intimations are given. In regard to separable verbs the author has almost confined himself to an enumeration of the *prefixes*, with a translation of these latter (for instance: *auf, up or upon; zu, to*—which is altogether insufficient). He ought to have given here examples of the compound *verbs* themselves, not merely of the prefixes, for in this way the student will either form a wrong idea of a compound verb or no idea at all. He should, also, have given the leading significations of these verbs, showing, by sufficient examples, the change of meaning which they undergo by their prefixes. This omission is the more singular as he dwells with more than necessary explicitness on the derivation of the *inseparable* prefixes (2 pages small print); an exposition which he even repeats almost literally in another part of his grammar (p. 137 and p. 185).

That the author in fact has been sometimes bewildered by his own rules, strikingly appears from the fact that he considers the verb *umarmen* as a separable compound (p. 185, III., 2), and hence must conjugate thus: *er armte mich um* (which sounds exactly as in English would sound '*he braced me em*'). Thus he states (p. 136, § 305) that *anbetteffen, einverleiben* and *vorenthalten* are never used, except in such verbal forms or such arrangements, as require the separable prefix to stand before the verb. This is a palpable error, since we regularly say *es betrifft mich an, er verleibt den Staat ein, er enthielt mir das vor*. Only the forms *auf, außer* can never be separated.

It is likewise an error, when the author states that "true compounds, if they have not the accent on the first syllable, *lose the augment* in the participle, thus: *froßlod'en, froßlod't*." *Froßlod'en* is accented *either* on the first *or* on the second syllable, and hence its participle is *either* *gefroßlod't* *or* *froßlod't* (Flügel accents the verb *only* on the first syllable; but Grimm gives both accentuations, and that on the first syllable as the primary one). Thus *offenbaren*, which *never* has the accent on the first syllable, and certainly is a "true compound," nevertheless may both take or reject the augment (*offenbart* or *geoffenbart*).

The author's tendency to obscure his rules by mixing them with abstract and sterile theories is especially apparent p. 126—129, in his chapter on REFLEXIVE VERBS. His single rules are based on two absolutely conflicting theories, so that sometimes the one, sometimes the other is followed. The beginner, after perusing this chapter, will feel like the scholar in Faust. According to the one of these theories a verb is called reflexive, when it has a reflexive pronoun for an object. This theory considers *sich töten* (to kill one's self) as much a reflexive verb as *sich schämen* (to be ashamed), or *seiner selbst gedenken* (to be mindful of one's self). The other theory (especially in vogue since Becker) considers as reflexive only those verbs which *must* be connected with reflexive pronominal objects, either under all circumstances, or in certain significations.¹ This latter theory is void of all historical truth, and we wonder that the author, with his love for historical points, has given it his favor. Every verb, which Becker, and after him the author, calls reflexive, was originally a common verb with a reflexive object. *Practically*, and especially for a student, not vernacularly acquainted with German, the whole distinction is utterly unimportant and even perplexing. For none can know whether a given verb in certain significations occurs *only* reflexively, unless he has thoroughly mastered the different significations of this verb. The author, indeed, has shown that he occasionally lacks this knowledge himself. Thus we have seen already that he erroneously translates *fürchten* by 'to frighten,' and therefrom derives the meaning 'to be afraid' of the reflexive *sich fürchten*. This meaning of *fürchten*, however, he must have soon forgotten; for in § 287 he (correctly) translates *fürchten* by 'to fear,' but derives the signification of *sich fürchten* from a general rule "that a reflexive verb is often related to the simple verb as a corresponding intransitive to a transitive, as *freuen*,² to give

¹ The author expresses this distinction very obscurely and hardly intelligibly for a beginner, thus: 1) Those verbs which are only used with a reflexive object, as *sich schämen*, to be ashamed; 2) those which are usually or often used reflexively, and have a special meaning in that use; the object not maintaining its independence, but combining with the verb to form a single conception, the equivalent of an intransitive verb: as *sich hüten*, 'beware' (*hüten*, 'guard'). We think it to be pretty hard for a beginner to know whether a verb "usually" or "often" is combined with a reflexive object.

² *freuen* in the meaning "to give pleasure to," is altogether obsolete; and were it not so, the verb

pleasure to, *sich freuen*, to feel pleasure; *fürchten*, to fear, *sich fürchten*, to be afraid."¹ His treatment of the verb *vertrauen* (p. 142, § 318, a) shows this still more strikingly. He says: *wir vertrauen uns auf ihn*, stands for *wir vertrauen uns ihm*, *we trust in him*. This is doubly wrong. First, *wir vertrauen uns auf ihn* is no German at all; it ought to be: *wir vertrauen auf ihn*; and then, *wir vertrauen uns ihm* does not mean 'we trust in him,' but "we entrust ourselves to him."

That the author has mixed up both theories of reflexive verbs, appears from his very first paragraph (283). The first section "a reflexive verb is one that represents the action as exerted by the subject upon himself" is evidently based on the theory that every verb with a reflexive object is a reflexive verb, for it embraces not only such verbs as *sich töten* (to kill one's self), but also verbs that require an object in the dative (as *ich erlaube mir*, I allow myself). But in the second section of the same paragraph we read: "Such verbs are grammatically transitive, since they take an object in the accusative." By this clause all verbs, governing a genitive or a dative, are excluded from the number of reflexives, which can only be explained, if Becker's theory is adopted. But the author must have become aware that there are nevertheless reflexive verbs governing the dative, and so he proposes in the last paragraph of the chapter (§ 290) a middle theory: "A small number² of verbs are used with a reflexive object in the dative in a manner quite analogous with the true reflexive verbs, and therefore form a class of improper reflexives.—Most of these require in addition a direct object in the accusative: thus, *ich mache mir kein Anrecht an*, 'I make no unjust claim,' *ich bilde mir das nicht ein*, 'I do not imagine that.' But *sich schmeicheln* 'flatter one's self,' is intransitive. It is rather remarkable that the author did not notice, how completely his theory about the transitive nature of reflexives is killed by these statements. For if all reflexives are transitives according to their nature, none of them can be intransitive.

In the other sections of this chapter the terms "transitive" and "intransitive" are applied with various force and meaning to the reflexives. After saying that all reflexives are grammatically transitive, and logically intransitive, he states that any transitive verb in the language may be used reflexively, as if not all verbs governing the genitive or dative might be just as well used "reflexively." Then we learn that an intransitive verb is "much more often" used transitively with a reflexive object than with one of another character (§ 288), and finally, that an intransitive³ reflexive is sometimes used impersonally (*es tanzt sich hier gut*).

The principal interest which the student has in the chapter on reflexive verbs is evidently: 1) To know in which case⁴ to place the reflexive. This can not be learned from the author's rules, by which the student will be induced to commit the worst grammatical blunders (as: *ich gebe mich Mühe*, I take pains—reflexive verbs, according to the author, taking their objects in the accusative); 2) to know the instances in which English neuter verbs must be translated by German reflexives, which is not imparted by the author, though it might be taught in a few words. Thus the student would not learn by the author's grammar how to translate into German such simple phrases, as: The earth moves (*die Erde bewegt sich*); the heat increases (*die Hitze vermehrt sich*). While, then, the student does not learn the plainest elements, he is taught a

would not be a reflexive in the sense of the author; for if *freuen* means 'to give pleasure to somebody,' then *sich freuen* must mean 'to give pleasure to one's self' (or to *fast* pleasure).

¹ We are afraid (*wir fürchten*)—not *wir fürchten uns*! that we must even here contradict the author; and that we are right, he will see from our use of the verb *fürchten* in the beginning of this very sentence.

² The number of these verbs is by no means small. If it were so, the author ought to have enumerated them all, since the student must learn to use the correct case with reflexive verbs. We mention here only a small part of these reflexives: *sich widersprechen*, *sich erlauben*, *sich gefallen*, *sich gestatten*, *sich gefallen*, *sich etwas austreten*, *sich verhehlen*, *sich etwas erklären*, *sich etwas verjagen*, *sich verjagen*, *sich aneignen*, *sich angewöhnen*, *sich es versehen*, *sich etwas zu Gute thun*, *sich etwas ausdenken*, *sich etwas bekommen lassen*, *sich Rath wissen*, *sich etwas ausbitten*, *sich zu schaffen machen*. But there are many more.

³ If what the author says is true, namely that all reflexive verbs are logically intransitive and grammatically transitive, it will be very difficult to connect any sense with the expression "transitive reflexive." It is either pleonastic or contradictory to the rule.

⁴ The author very peculiarly says that a reflexive pronoun takes the gender of its subject (§ 284), forgetting that the reflexive pronouns are not distinguished in gender at all.

sterile and hollow theory, illustrated by the most unusual and, as they stand, hardly intelligible phrases, such as: *Es sieht sich gar artig in die Stützen hinein*, it is very pretty looking into the carriages (§ 288, 2).

What is said of the author's treatment of reflexive verbs, applies in a still higher degree to his treatment of the SUBJUNCTIVE (p. 148—154), a subject which has generally received a pretty rough handling from our grammarians (the Germans not excepted). He has here more details than we generally find in other grammars; but they are not always correct and often obscure and fragmentary. Some of the most important rules are left out, while some of the most unimportant particulars are presented. Many of these latter are forced under certain general principles,¹ while some are not assigned to any, and seem to occupy their respective places only by chance.² This looseness seems to have sometimes led the author to using faulty subjunctives, or to consider as subjunctives what are unmistakable indicatives.³ He classifies all his special rules under three heads: 1) the subjunctive as optative; 2) the subjunctive as conditional and potential; 3) the subjunctive of indirect statement.⁴ The OPTATIVE-subjunctive, according to the author, is a present subjunctive expressing a wish, request or direction (§ 331, 1). He limits this subjunctive to the third persons of both numbers, and the first plural: for the first singular he requires *möge* 'may' as auxiliary, which auxiliary he also admits for the other persons. Here the author seems to have forgotten Mephisto's reply in Goethe's *Faust*: *Gehe ich's nur, daß ich hinausjagiere* &c. (let me confess, etc.) Nor is the auxiliary *möge* always allowed as substitute for the optative, as: *Hören wir, was er zu sagen hat*, let us hear, etc., where we may substitute *lassen* but not *mögen*. Nor is *mögen* always used in the subjunctive, as he requires, the indicative *mag* being more frequent (*Der Mensch mag unternehmen, was es sei, stets wird* &c. *Götte, D. u. B.*, 4, 153). He states (p. 149, d. e.) that this subjunctive sometimes becomes in application *concessive*, or expresses a supposition or assumption, and "hence" it becomes with *benn* by an elliptical construction equivalent to "unless," thus, *„Biebererwerben soll ihn keiner,"* or *führ denn Freya zur Braut mir heim* (nobody shall acquire it again, unless he bring me home Freya as bride) i. e. [if he would gain what he wishes] then let him bring, etc.: an interpretation, devised by the author himself, and which we are afraid will have but few endorsers.⁵

¹ Thus he takes the subjunctive in this sentence, *ich wäre fast gegen Baumstämme gerannt*, I came near running against trunks of trees (p. 151, 3, a) for one of those subjunctives that are used to soften the positiveness of an assertion, where the author seems to have been misled by the English translation. This subjunctive is *hypothetical* (expressing in an affirmative form something contrary to reality), and the word *fast* has the force of an hypothetical clause (if I had gone on so, or the like). On the other hand he takes the phrase, *ist mir das fern, daß ich das eute rühre* (relieve my heart that I may move yours), p. 152, 5, b, for a species of hypothetical subjunctive, since he had no general category to which he might have assigned a subjunctive of *purport*.

² This is especially the case with the subjunctive in concessive clauses, which he sometimes considers as real conditionals "only modified by various causes (unb wären von Gott sie, ich gäbe sie dir, p. 150, d); sometimes as "occasional phrases" analogous with the hypothetical clause (es mir nachgeahmt, wäre es nur mit einigen Stützen, p. 151, No. 4); sometimes as "akin with the potential and hypothetical uses of the subjunctive (wie auch der Menschliche" wollte, p. 152, 5, a), and sometimes even as *optatives* (er tute was er wollte, p. 149, § 331, d). In the last phrase he attempts to interpret the first of the two subjunctives, while the subjunctive *wollte* remains unexplained, and the student would search the author's grammar in vain for an explanation.

³ We have already seen that the author has among his exercises the sentence, *was er geht, wissen wir nicht*, in which the faulty subjunctive seems to be owing to his insufficient treatment of the subjunctive of "indirect statement" and to his ignoring the important rules on the use of the indicative in indirect questions (Becker, § 241, p. 429).—Page 152, No. 5 he declares the clear indicative *versinken* to be a subjunctive in the following sentence: *Er mußte bleiben, bis die Fluten sich versinken*, he was compelled to stay till the water subsided, the author incorrectly translating: "till the flood should subside."

⁴ In his introductory remarks he naively says that the *tenses* of the subjunctive require no separate treatment since the distinctions of tense in the subjunctive are of only subordinate value. Hence the student may consider himself justified in substituting a pluperfect subjunctive for a present or imperfect, and either of these tenses for a future!

⁵ The author has left out this first part of the sentence, taken from his Reader, although without it, the sentence could not be understood.

⁶ The true meaning of this construction of the subjunctive with *benn* (unless) is illustrated by Grimm (*Lex. v. bann*). This meaning of *benn* (formerly *bann*) is related to the meaning of *benn* or *bann* (than) after comparatives instead of *als*, and exactly corresponds to its Middle German meaning "except," as: *Niemand benn ich*, no one except myself. Prof. Whitney's interpretation is erroneous: a) because according to him, *benn* would be merely expletive, and the subjunctive would have the main force, while evidently *benn* is the essential word, and the subjunctive unessential, since the indicative was formerly likewise used in this construction; b) because the author assigns the con-

Other usages of this "optative-subjunctive" are not mentioned, as for instance the frequent use of the present subjunctive in disjunctive sentences, corresponding to the English "whether—or," as: Jeder nähme dies lieber selbst vor, er habe nun Geschick dazu oder nicht, Göthe, D. u. W., 3, 126 (whether he have a skill for it or not).

The CONDITIONAL subjunctive, according to the author, is confined to the "hypothetical period," when the condition is "untrue" or "against reality" (§ 332, 1). In this case a past tense in the subjunctive in both parts of the period is required by the author. But if the condition be regarded as "doubtful merely" and not contrary to reality," the author requires the indicative mood for both verbs (§ 332, d) as wenn er kommt, gehe ich fort, if he comes I shall go away. These statements are not quite correct. For the conditional subjunctive is by no means always dependent on the untruth or non-reality of the condition. It is used if the condition is *assumed* or *supposed* by the speaker, and it makes no difference whether the condition is contrary to reality or not, as for instance: Tell, wenn du dir's getraute'st, uns zu helfen aus dem Sturm, so mach' ich dich der Bande wohl entleiben, Schiller, Tell, 4, 1 (Tell, if you were confident to help us from the storm, I might be willing to release you from the bonds). Here, certainly, neither the condition nor the conclusion are contrary to reality. Both are "merely doubtful," since Tell in reality *is* confident and subsequently is released from bonds. Yet nevertheless the subjunctive preterit is employed, since the *speaker* (Gessler) *assumes* as a condition a fact which is doubtful to him. Nor is it necessary that the verbs in both clauses of the period should be in the same tense of the subjunctive or indicative, but sometimes different tenses and moods are used, as: Ich suchte diese Empfindungen, wenn sie sich mir aufdrängen sollten, abzulehnen, Göthe, D. u. W., 6, 114 (I try to repress these feelings, if they should take hold of me), and the sentence quoted by the author himself (taken from Göthe's *Carneval*—§ 332, 4), so daß ihm nichts als die Reitaute übrig bleibt,¹ besonders wenn er sich verschossen haben sollte. On the other hand we by no means use always the subjunctive of a past tense (or the conditional mood) when the condition is "against reality." On the contrary, the preterit *indicative* is used in both clauses of the period, in order to express the non-reality of the condition with especial force, as: Ich konnte glücklich werden, wenn ich der Wünsche Ungebulb bezwang, Schiller, Tell, 5, 2 (I might have been happy, if I had restrained the impatience of my desires).

The POTENTIAL subjunctive is a term which the author has borrowed from Heyse (p. 207), who treats this form of the subjunctive with great looseness and superficiality. He has essentially modified Heyse's statements, but we must confess, we did not fully succeed in realizing his idea, though we tried hard; and we doubt whether the students generally will succeed any better. The author calls the subjunctive "*conditional*" if the condition is either fully expressed, or implicated by a word or phrase.² But of the *potential* subjunctive he gives the following definition: *A yet less explicit implication of a condition makes of the past subjunctive a "proper" potential, expressing what in general under the circumstances, might, could or would be* (§ 332, 3), as das ginge noch, that might answer yet; es hätte sich's feiner vermogen, no one would have presumed to do

ditional force to the *principal* sentence (if you want to obtain it again), while on the contrary the *clause* (er bringe denn Freya, unless he brings, etc.) with the subjunctive, and not the preceding sentence, is conditional; c) because this interpretation would fit only a *present* subjunctive (*let him bring*, etc.), while the same construction appears in the subjunctive of *all* tenses es wäre denn, daß; er habe denn gesagt, daß; es müßte denn zc.). That indeed the author's interpretation will not answer, appears from the Middle-German, in which these sentences were made *negative*, as: *er woldet got denne understan*, Wig. 2459 (literally: Gott müßte es denn nicht verhinbern mössen; but with an affirmative meaning). Sentences of this kind could never be interpreted according to the author's method, with or without the negative.

¹ The author has omitted this part of the sentence, which evidently constitutes the conclusion of the conditional period. In its mutilated state he uses it as an example of "occasional phrases, analogous with the clause expressing the condition;" while it contains a complete conditional period, which, it is true, would not fit his rules in § 332, 1. Hence he tried, though unsuccessfully, a different interpretation.

² Thus he calls the subjunctive "*conditional*" if the condition is implied by the word *bann* or *sonst*, as: *sonst wäre er gefallen*, otherwise [if this were not so] he would have fallen p. 151, No. e).

³ From this we must infer that there exist also *improper* potentials, by which the author perhaps means the "special cases," mentioned under No. 5, namely the subjunctive used after *mit* and *bamit*, and which it seems quite evident that here the dose of conditional meaning would be somewhat homoeopathic.

80. We infer from this definition that the **POTENTIAL** subjunctive always implies a condition, but "less explicitly" than the **CONDITIONAL** subjunctive, i. e. the condition must not be implied even by a single word; else the subjunctive would be "conditional." Hence he cannot mean anything else, but that the implication of the condition should appear from the connection alone. Unfortunately, however, all the examples given are torn from their connections; nor does he inform us what those conditions are that he means to supply. Thus he has deprived us of the only means by which we might understand the nature of his "potential subjunctive." But we are not quite sure that we have understood the author even so far; for in his later examples (p. 155, c) he gives us the following instance of a potential "conditional:" *Sich ernstlich zu wehren würde sehr gefährlich sein* (to defend one's self seriously would be very dangerous), in which sentence the subject-infinitive *sich ernstlich zu wehren* evidently is an abridged conditional clause (*es würde sehr gefährlich sein, wenn man sich ernstlich wehren wollte*), so that here the condition is not "less explicitly implicated," but clearly expressed. Hence either the author must have misunderstood the quoted sentence, or we cannot have understood the author correctly. Nor do we understand what the author means by the words "in general" and "under all circumstances," unless he meant thereby to exclude the "special" circumstances of the case; but this expedient would not apply to his examples, as: *es könnte mich retten*, a phrase taken from Schiller's *Mary Stuart*, which, completed, reads thus: *Dies elende Fahrzeug könnte mich retten*; (this wretched skiff might rescue me). Here, evidently, is not expressed "what in general under the circumstances might be," but what the speaker (queen Mary) under her *special* circumstances might effect, if the owner would lend her his vessel.—Nor do we understand why the author mentions only the words *might, could, would*, and not also *should* and *ought*; for it seems to us that phrases like *er hätte dies thun sollen* (he ought to have done this) have the same claim to be considered "potential" as those with *might, could* or *would*. With all these details the author has forgotten the most important point of the whole chapter: a precise rule for the rendering of the German conditional into English and of the English potential into German.¹ This would have been infinitely more practical than the whole remainder of his rules on the subject. The practical inexpediency of these rules is not a little increased by the fact that the author has treated the conditional period as a mere appendix to the subjunctive. This necessitated a repeated treatment of the same subject as an appendix to the conditional mood. Thus the double inconvenience arises that many rules are given twice, and that a subject which the student ought to have under one view, is torn asunder. The different forms under which the conditional period appears, and the varied force of the conditional conjunctions and their omission, are either entirely disregarded, or so dispersed that it will be very difficult for the student to find the necessary information, when needed. Thus we find no express statement of the important rule that the English potential with *would* or *should* can never be rendered by the German conditional² in the clause containing the condition, but that it must be rendered by the preterit subjunctive either of the main verb or of the auxiliaries *wollen* and *sollen*. The only way for the student to arrive at the first part of this rule is by *inference*, while the last part of the rule is not found at all. The author considers the German conditional mood as nothing but an admissible substitute of the preterit subjunctive in some of its uses, while he claims that the latter always may be substituted for the former,³ adding that the con-

¹ Thus for instance the different translations of *would*, either by *würde*, *wollte* or the subjunctive of the main verb; and of *should* by *würde*, *sollte* or the subjunctive. These renderings would include all material points of the author's details, without encumbering us with abstract and in a great measure erroneous theories. That he is not quite firm in translating these moods, sufficiently appears from our remarks p. 303, regarding his rendering *er wollte es nicht gethan haben*, and "he would not have done it."

² Although in the author's paradigms the German conditional is everywhere translated by "should."

³ We must decidedly contradict this. In the passive construction it would be generally very harsh to substitute the imperfect subjunctive for the conditional. Take for instance the following sentence: *Er würde zu sonderbaren Betrachtungen aufgeregt werden, wenn er eine solche Kritik freies müste*, *§ 514 c, Annal. 243*. Every teacher would correct here the imperfect *würde* *aufgeregt* if his pupils would use it. Thus in the active of weak verbs the substitution of the subjunctive for the conditional must often be considered as faulty.

ditional is much less frequent than the preterit-subjunctive (p. 155), statements which will be contradicted by every German knowing his own language.¹

The subjunctive of INDIRECT STATEMENT, according to the author, is used to express a thought indirectly, as reported, recognized or contemplated by "some one" (§ 333, 1). This definition is too vague, for every thought without any exception is recognized by "some one." It is true, he adds the word "indirectly;" but this is just the expression that the definition ought to have explained. Becker is here much clearer, when he says: "a *quoted* assertion of a person introduced by the author (einer besprochenen Person)." In consequence of this vagueness the student will be unable to distinguish those cases in which the subjunctive *must*, or *may* or *cannot* be used. The author, indeed, is compelled to acknowledge (p. 154) that the indicative *may* also be used in these sentences, "mostly with an implication of actuality, as recognized by the speaker;" but that "the difference of implication is often very indistinct, and the choice between the two moods depends in part upon the style used: too nice a use of the subjunctive in easy discourse would be thought *finical* and *pedantic*."² Thus the author evades one of those difficulties which are generally very imperfectly treated in our Anglo-German grammars. He will readily acknowledge that the use of the subjunctive of indirect statement in a great number of cases is *imperative* [for instance: er fragte, wo ich sei (not bin or war), Göthe, Ben. Cell. 23; er wähnt, daß du abwesend seiest (not bist), etc.]; and again, that in many instances of what the author calls indirect statement it would be faulty to use a subjunctive, as: Ich weiß nicht, was er gesagt hat (not habe). Ich weiß, daß du das Gute willst (not wollest), Göthe, Zaffo, 141; and that, in other instances, the use of the moods depends on the conception of the speaker, as: Sie glauben, daß er die alten Zeiten wieder einzuführen gedenkt (or gebenke), Göthe, D. u. B., 13, 115. If this is so, there *must* be a rule to determine this use, which—it is true—stands in none of our Anglo-German grammars, so that we cannot find fault with the author for failing where the others failed. But we *must* find fault with him for making the student believe that the subjunctive of indirect statement *may* in all cases be replaced by an indicative.

It is another error when the author says that the subjunctive of indirect statement "always" stands in a *substantive* clause (§ 333, 2). The fact is that all possible clauses, if stated indirectly, are placed in the subjunctive (conditional, concessive, relative, temporal, comparative, etc.). Compare Göthe, Wanderjahre, 1, p. 58: Sie sagte, sie könne es einem Ehrenmanne, wie ich zu sein scheine, nicht verdenken, wenn er ein Mädchen, das er allein auf der Landstraße treffe, einigermassen verdächtig halte, ob sie gleich fremd sei.—About the TENSES of this subjunctive the author says (p. 153, 4):

Regularly the verb in the indirect statement has the same tense as it would have if the statement were made directly, by the person and under the circumstances contemplated.

It will be very easy to prove this rule to be incorrect. Take for instance the following *direct* statement: Ich war gestern beschäftigt (I was occupied yesterday). According to the author's rule the *indirect* statement would be: Ich sagte ihm, daß ich gestern beschäftigt wäre. But this would be a fault, and it must be "beschäftigt gewesen sei" (perfect), and not wäre (imperfect). Of this erroneous rule the author knows two exceptions, the one of which is even more faulty than the rule itself. He says (p. 153, c):

Rarely a subjunctive of indirect statement is forced out of the past tense which it should have into the present, as the more usual tense belonging to the indirect construction (see Reader, 190, 33.)

The sentence in the Reader to which he refers to illustrate this exception, is: Die Gefahr preßte dem Kaiser den Wunsch ab: er wolle gern jede Noth ertragen,

¹ That at least in North-Germany the use of the conditional is far more frequent than that of the subjunctive is a notorious fact. A few pages in Göthe will convince the author of his error. Many writers (for inst. E. T. Hoffmann) almost never use the subjunctive for the conditional. For the beginner the conditional mood should unquestionably be given as the rule, and the subjunctive as the exception.

² Even this definition is not quite correct, because "quoted" should be modified by the addition "not in the own words of the person introduced."

³ The author evidently has thought here of the *present* subjunctive, which is very rarely used in conversation. For this generally is substituted an imperfect subjunctive, which never would be thought finical and pedantic even in the easiest conversation, if used at the right place.

wenn nur das Heer in Antiochien wäre (the danger extorted from the emperor the desire: that he would willingly bear every deprivation, if but the army were in Antioch). But in this sentence there is no "forcing" from the proper preterit into an improper present. The direct statement would be: Ich will gern jede Noth ertragen, wenn nur das Heer in Antiochien wäre,¹ and hence, according to the author's own rule, the statement had to be made indirect by changing the present indicative will into the present subjunctive wolle. The "forcing" of a proper preterit into a present subjunctive would be always a solecism.

In spite of all the explicitness of the author on this subject, there are several kinds of subjunctives which he has not attempted to explain. We mention here only the subjunctives in relative clauses, when the antecedent is a negative or combined with a negation, as: Er hatte niemals einen Bedienten, der nicht im Hause noch zu etwas nützlich gewesen wäre, Göthe, D. u. W., 6, 41. Und Niemand ist, der ihn vor Unglück schütze, Schiller, Tell, 31. The rules on the German subjunctive can never be successfully presented, unless its use in the different clauses is separately explained. The treatment of the subjunctive according to general principles will answer for a philosophical grammar; but in a practical grammar it must necessarily lead to confusion and perplexity.

In the chapter on the INFINITIVE (p. 156—161) we have noticed several obscure statements and inaccuracies. Thus the author's remark referring to haben with an infinitive:

haben 'have' in certain phrases with an adjective (governs an infinitive without zu): thus, du hast gut reden 'that is easy to say' (i. e. thou hast talking good, makest an easy thing of talking).

This explanation obscures instead of illustrating the idiom. "Du hast gut reden" precisely corresponds to the English "*you may well talk*" (sometimes it means "it is in vain for you to talk"), and in order to explain the expression, it was necessary to determine the meaning of haben in this connection. It is peculiar that this idiomatic phrase is given as the only example of the "regular" construction of haben with an infinitive without zu, while the evidently regular phrase: er hat Wein im Keller liegen 'he has wine lying in the cellar' (p. 158) is mentioned as a "special and more anomalous case."

In the same chapter we find a striking example of the author's tendency to obscure the grammatical facts of the language by dogmatic and abstract reasoning. He says (p. 157, a):

This construction (of a verb with a substantive-object along with an infinitive), especially with sehen, hören and lassen (and by far oftener with the last), is followed out into a variety of other forms, some of them of a peculiar and idiomatic character: thus,

b. The proper object of the governing verb is frequently omitted, and the infinitive then designates the action without reference to any definite actor: thus, ich höre klopfen, 'I hear [some one] knock (hear a knocking);'

c. If, then, the infinitive itself takes an object, the construction is equivalent to one in which that object is directly dependent upon the governing verb, and is the subject-accusative of the infinitive taken as an infinitive passive; and it is generally best so rendered: thus, ich höre euch jeden Tag preisen, 'I hear you to be praised every day (hear [them] praise you)'; er ließ die drei Ringe für einen machen, 'he caused the three rings to be made in place of one (caused to make them).'

d. That the construction has in fact, in the apprehension of those who use the language, been virtually converted into a passive one, and the real object of the infinitive transferred to the governing verb, is shown by the circumstance that that object, when designating the same person or thing with the subject of the verb, is expressed by the reflexive instead of the personal pronoun: thus, er wollte sich nicht lassen hören, 'he would not let himself be heard' (instead of 'would not allow [any one] to hold him'); das läßt sich hören, 'that lets itself be heard (i. e. is worth hearing)'; als er sich times vorlesen ließ, 'as he was hearing something read aloud to himself.' Occasionally, the logical subject of lassen is even added in the form of a prepositional adjunct: thus, sie ließen sich durch die Wache nicht abhalten, 'they did not suffer themselves to be restrained by the guards'—instead of sie ließen die Wache sie nicht abhalten, 'they did not suffer the guards to restrain them.'

This whole discussion amounts to worse than nothing. The plain rule is this: When the verbs sehen, hören and lassen are followed by an accusative

¹ The author seems to be of the opinion that the direct statement must be: Ich wolle gern jede Noth ertragen &c., probably because he assumes that in the conditional period *both* predicates must be in the past tense. But above we have shown this to be a mistake. The deprivations were actual and real ones; this is expressed by the indicative present will. Thus one mistake has begotten an other.

² The verb haben obviously has not the meaning "make" here. "Thou makest an easy thing of talking" is very different from what the German understands by, du hast gut reden."

³ Here the second interpretation (evidently the correct one) is incompatible with the rule, and with the first parenthesis "some one." The two interpretations destroy each other.

along with an object-infinitive, the latter has ACTIVE meaning if intransitive, and PASSIVE if transitive. Thus, *ich höre ihn jchreien*, I hear him crying; but *ich höre ihn tadeln*, I hear him being censured (I hear that he is censured); *ich lasse ihn sterben*, I suffer (or cause) him to die, but *ich lasse ihn töten*, I suffer (or cause) him to be killed. The author has contrived to involve this rule in such a maze of discussion, that the student will find it extremely difficult even to recognize the rule, and his statements, notwithstanding their length, do not contain even so much material, as the few lines just presented. If our grammarians would but begin to understand that the usages of a language are generally plainer and more reasonable than their ways of explaining them, which often create instead of removing difficulties! The author seems to have encountered such a difficulty in the passive meaning of active infinitives, and, hence, tries to explain it away by supplying a personal object of the principal verb, in order to obtain thus a logical subject for the active infinitive. But against this theory there are two objections which are decisive: 1) Although the same usage is already found in the Old-German language, still not a trace can be discovered that an infinitive with passive form has ever been used in this connection. And yet this form would have been indispensable to express phrases of this kind with *uncertain* subjects, as: *ich ließ ein Haus bauen*, I caused a house to be built.¹ To supply, with the author, for an explanation of such active forms with uncertain subjects, the English "them" (I caused *them* to build a house), is inadmissible since the *actual use* of such a pronoun in this connection and signification cannot be proved. 2) We find these active infinitives construed in a way, admissible only with PASSIVE verbs, namely with the preposition *von*, denoting the passive agent, as: *Er ließ die Brücke von seinen Leuten errichten*, 'he caused the bridge to be built by his men.' To supply here the object "seine Leute" after *ließ* would be a grammatical impossibility. The author must have been aware of the weight of this latter objection, for he adds that the construction has in fact "in the apprehension of those who use the language" been virtually converted into a passive one. But it is exactly the fact of "conversion" that cannot be proved. Since he acknowledges that those "who use the language" consider and treat these infinitives as passives, it would be perfectly safe to let the American beginner do the same thing. The use of active infinitives and participles with the force of passives in those languages that form their passives by means of auxiliaries is by no means wanting in analogies. So in English: "This is easy to see," "the house is building," in French: *il fait faire un habit; des chambres à louer*; in German: *es ist nicht zu erraten* &c.² And the author himself does not hesitate (§ 351) to assign to the past participle of all transitive verbs, which he (erroneously) considers as ACTIVE, a PASSIVE meaning, and that without a word of explanation.

In the chapter on participles (p. 162) we find the remark that the past participle of a verb taking *sein* as an auxiliary may be used *attributively*, as: *Der gefallene Schnee*, the fallen snow. But only a very few participles admit of this active and attributive meaning. Thus we cannot say *der geliebene Mann* (a man that has remained), *das gelaufene Kind*, *der geflogene Vogel*, *der geflossene Strom* &c.

On page 164 we read the following remark:

Participles may not be used, as in English, to signify a determining cause or otherwise adverbially: in such phrases as "not finding him, I walked away," walking uprightly we walk surely," having shuted him we retired," full adverbial clauses must be substituted for the participial phrases: thus, *ba ich ihn nicht fand*; — *wenn wir aufrichtig wandeln*; — *nachdem wir ihn begrüßt hatten*. Rarely, however, the participle approaches a causative force; thus, *bies besüchtend tödtete er den Botschaften*, 'fearing this, he slew the messenger.'

¹ We are of the opinion that this English passive infinitive is a comparatively modern innovation, since we find in Anglo-Saxon many active infinitives with passive meaning, but no real passive infinitives in connections of this kind.

² These usages are very easily explained by the nature of infinitive and participial forms. Having no grammatical subject, nor personal endings, they denote the verbal action in its widest sense, and are well adapted to the meaning of either voice, as far as no ambiguity will arise. Their nature as verbal substantives and respectively adjectives seems to place this quality beyond doubt. *Das Tadeln des Mannes* (the censuring of the man) as well as *der Tadel des Mannes* may be accepted in both an active and passive sense, and even the Latin language shows in its gerund (*ars scribendi*) a passive form with active signification, a freedom which in Greek is even extended to the personal forms, the middle voice having either active or passive meaning according to the connection.

These statements are unfounded in almost every particular. It would be remarkable if the causal participle in *dies befürchtend tödtete er ic.* should be good German, while the completely analogous sentence "not finding him, I walked away" should not admit of a literal translation into German. And indeed the literal rendering "*Ich nicht findend, ging ich fort*" is unexceptionable German. The next sentence "walking uprightly, etc., might be literally translated (*Aufrichtig wandelnd wandelt man sicher*) and would be good German, if it were not for the immediate succession of two forms belonging to the same verb. The third sentence, "having saluted," may not be translated literally, not, however, on account of the "adverbial force" of the participle, but simply because the German language lacks the active participle of the perfect. The German language quite frequently uses participial constructions with the force of causal, conditional, temporal, concessive and other clauses, as: *Er nahm ihn in sein Gefolge, versichert* (being assured, since he was assured), *daß derselbe die beste Aufnahme finden würde.* Varnhagen, *Sophie Charl.*, p. 136. *Die Landesfinder, Beförderung hoffend* (hoping for promotion, since they hoped for promotion) *magten es nicht sich von der Sitte loszusagen.* Göthe, *D. u. W.*, 6, 46. *Durch den Strom geschieden* (separated by the stream, since they were separated), *konnten sie nur ein ohnmächtig Wehgeschrei erheben.* Schiller, *Tell*, p. 157. *Nur im mindesten schmerzlich berührt* (being painfully touched in the least, if you are touched, etc.), *bist du noch eben so geneigt, dich allem Unmuth hinzugeben.* Hoffmann, *Serapionbrüder*, 1, p. 6. *Ein Wald, der immer durchsichtiger werdend* (becoming, while it became), *zulezt die Bestigung im klarsten Sonnenlichte sehen ließ.* Göthe, *Wanderl.*, 1, 48. — *Eintretend in das Schloß* (entering into the castle, when he entered), *sah er die Wände der Haussfur auf eine eigene Weise besleibet.* Ib. 53. — *Keine schweren Pflichten fordernd* (not claiming any difficult duties, although it claims) *verleiht sie nur ein ohnmächtig Wehgeschrei.* Göthe, *zum Westfälischen Diwan*, p. 186. — It is true, participial constructions are rarer in German than in English, but only because the German language disposes of a great variety of briefer and more pointed forms to express thoughts which in English must be expressed by means of participial constructions,¹ or by full clauses.² Such constructions ought to have been explained; but even if we do not find fault with such omissions, it might have been expected that the author would not invent rules that are without foundation in fact.

In the chapter on PREPOSITIONS (p. 171) he enumerates 18 prepositions governing the dative, although on page 83 he says that they amount to "about 20." Among the 18 prepositions he mentions *gleich*, like, although *gleich* is an adjective, and no grammarian ever yet called it a preposition. But if *gleich* is a preposition, we evidently must consider likewise as prepositions the words *nahe*, *fern*, *unfern*, *ähnlich*, all of which govern the dative, the same as *gleich*. On the other hand the preposition *zunächst* is left out. In respect to *aufser* we read the remark that, only in the phrase *aufser Landes*, it governs the genitive.³ He remarks further that occasionally, by a bold construction, a word which is properly adverb only is constructed as if preposition: thus, *voran den fähnen Reihen*, 'in front of the brave ranks' (p. 171, § 374, c).⁴ Here the author ought

¹ Here belong especially the different prepositional phrases of the German language which the English language frequently or regularly must express by participial constructions: *Linguistic knowledge being more and more enlarged*, that peculiar knowledge was developed which, etc. *Bei immer wachsenden Sprachkenntnissen entwickelte sich jene Art des Studiums, die ic.* Göthe, *D. u. W.*, 6, 73. — *Having no longer control over myself, I struck the messenger.* *Meiner selbst nicht Herr, schlug ich den Boten.* Schiller, *Tell*, 31. — *Peace being concluded, nach geschlossenem Frieden.* Schiller, *Aussand der Rieberlande*, 23. — *Acting thus without plan, bei meinem zwecklosen Handeln.* Göthe, *D. u. W.*, 6, 223.

² For instance: *bei untergehender Sonne* (when the sun is setting) *steht man den Mond gern aufgehen.* Göthe, *D. u. W.*, 13, 139.

³ Grimm (in the lexicon) gives several other phrases in which *aufser* is construed with a genitive, and considers it then as an adverb (used instead of *aufserhalb*). It might have been mentioned that many grammarians construe *aufser* with a dative or accusative, and that even classical authors (for instance Schiller) construe *aufser* occasionally with the latter case, although Grimm considers such constructions as blunders.

⁴ Such phrases as *den Berg hinauf* the author does not view in this light, but takes the accusative *den Berg* not dependent on *hinauf*, but as "absolute" (p. 172, No. c). However, he gives no examples, and without such we can do nothing with remarks of this kind. Thus in the phrase, *den Berg hinauf waren Bäume* which is the most "absolute" construction of the word we can imagine, the accusative *den Berg* is evidently determined (that is governed) by *hinauf*, and hence certainly cannot be said to stand "absolutely." In the phrase *ich ging den Berg hinauf* the accusative is dependent on the compound verb *hinaufgehen*, and certainly not absolute. How can, then, a teacher explain such puzzles to the student?

to have given a complete sentence as example, since the relations of the adverb *voran* to a following dative may be very different ones. The sentence stands thus in the Reader: *Stiege voran den fähnen Reihen* (p. 58), in which the dative evidently is the regular case, required by the verb *voransteigen*. But whatever may be the connection of the phrase, we fail to see any boldness of construction in an adverb governing a dative. In § 372, b, we have a long philosophical discussion about the cases that each preposition *ought* to govern; but the author finds that only *some* prepositions do as they ought. It is a great pity that grammarians cannot *make* the language. How many difficulties might in this way be spared to the student!—Concerning those prepositions that govern two cases he remarks that they stand with the dative when they indicate locality or situation "*merely*," or answer the question *where*, and with the accusative when they imply *motion* or tendency toward, or answer the question *whither*¹ (p. 172). He adds (p. 172, c) that the accusative and dative with their preposition have each its own proper value, the one as the case of directest action, the other as representing the ancient locative (or case denoting the *in* relation.² But he acknowledges that the difference of meaning is not always an obvious one, and continues:

Sometimes a peculiar liveliness is given to an expression by the employment of the accusative; thus, er machte eine Öffnung in die Erde, 'he made a hole in (into) the ground'; und fügte sie an den Mund, 'and kissed her on the mouth (imprinted a kiss)'; über den Rand der Tiefe gebogen, 'arched over (thrown as arch across) the edge of the abyss';³—or the accusative implies a 'verb of motion which is not expressed': thus, er stieg in ein Stübchen ab, 'he got down (and entered) into an inn'; er rettete sich in die Burg, 'he saved himself (betook himself for safety) into the castle'; sie stiegen in die Höhe, 'they stand up (rise to a standing posture)';⁴—or, the action is a figurative one: thus, an ihn denken, 'think of him' (turn one's thoughts on him); er sah auf all die Pracht, 'he looked upon

¹ The author has here essentially improved the rules given by *all* (if we are not mistaken) previous grammarians, inasmuch as he has seen that the case is not determined by the meaning of the governing verb, but the meaning of the preposition itself. This will unquestionably relieve a great many cases, hitherto a puzzle to many students, from all embarrassment. Nevertheless the rule might have been expressed more accurately. Take for instance the sentence given as example by the author: „Der Rachen schließt sich über dem Schwimmer“ (the abyss [?] closes over the swimmer). Here the question is not, "*where* (i. e. at which place) does the abyss close," but "*over* whom does it close," and hence the sentence would not strictly fall under the first rule, on account of its too narrow wording. Thus in the second part of the rule the expression "question *whither*" is easily misunderstood. In the author's sentence, „er hatte das Ohr auf den Rachen gelegt," 'he had his ear laid on the turf' (which should be 'he had laid his ear on,' etc.) we certainly would apply the question "*where*" in English (*where* did he place his ear). Hence the sentence would rather fall under the first rule, and the accusative must seem a puzzle to the student.

² This historical remark seems to be of very little use to the student. It is, moreover, not quite correct. For, certainly, the dative has not its *own proper value* when it *represents another case* (the locative.) Nor does the connection of the accusative (as the case of the direct object) with the question *whither* seem so clear that the one should be called the *own* and *proper value* of the other.

³ None of these different accusatives imparts any liveliness to the narrative, but they are the proper cases to be employed here. They all are explained by the fact (generally overlooked), that verbs designating the producing of any result (causative verbs) are considered as verbs of motion, and the prepositions *an*, *in*, *etc.* dependent on them, if they indicate this motion or production, must stand with the accusative. Hence in the first example *in* must stand with the accusative (den Grund) thus: *ich baute ein Lustschloß auf einen solchen Grund*, Göthe D. u. B. 6, 31. And so in the second example (he impressed a kiss on her mouth). For, although we shall not deny that osculation may sometimes be an affair of "peculiar liveliness," the circumstances of this kissing (in Uhland's *Der Strißen Löcherlein*) rather precluded liveliness, the kiss being applied to a corpse. The third example is again torn from its connection, and is incorrectly translated by the author. It is taken from Schiller's *Bergschloß*, and reads: *die Brüste, hoch über den Rand der Tiefe gebogen*. Gebogen does not mean "arched," as the author says, but "bent," and the verb "to bend something over another thing" is obviously a causative verb (to make that something bend), and requires the accusative after the prepositions *in*, *an*, *über*, *etc.* (thus: *Unters Joch biegen, Less.*). It is true that in the last of the author's examples the *datives* might have been used too, as in many other passages. This is especially the case after participles or perfects of such causative verbs, when an action that has happened before, is considered merely in its present results. Thus Göthe *Geb.* p. 94: *Da siehe ich an meinem Stab gebogen*; and the same author in the passage: *so du, auf deine Frau gelehnt, erschienst*, (Tasso p. 127) might have used with equal propriety the dative (*beinen Frauen*). That sometimes even classical authors have violated these rules is notorious. Thus Göthe uses an improper dative in the following passage: *In einem dieser Räume quartierte ich mich ein* (D. u. B. 6, 36). The same poet says in the Roman Elegies: *und des Herameters Raab ist auf dem Rücken gesäht*. This accusative, not long ago, created quite a lively discussion among the German critics. In consequence of which the latest editor (Kurtz) has permitted himself to change the accusative *dem Rücken* into *dem Rücken* (wrongly we believe).

⁴ To supply a verb of motion is necessary in none of these sentences, the idea of motion being here everywhere contained in the *prepositions* by which it is directly communicated to the principal verb. The author seems to have forgotten his own general rule that the case of the noun depends on the idea of the *preposition itself*.

all the beauty;¹ sie freuten über die schönen Äpfel;²—or these are phrases, the implication of which seems arbitrarily determined; thus, auf die beste Weise, 'in the best manner;' über tausend Jahre, 'after a thousand years.'³

That these statements are more or less erroneous appears from our remarks at the foot of the page. The author has entirely omitted to consider the synonymical relations of prepositions; nor does he attempt to show in which instances the same English prepositions must be expressed by a German case, and in which instances by a preposition (for instance the preposition *to*). Instead of it he presents us with a historical discussion on the origin of prepositions which he bases on the theory that the oldest prepositions were originally ADVERBS, an assertion which he introduces as an undoubted fact, although it is but a very doubtful opinion of some grammarians.⁴ Hence he calls prepositions a kind of "transitive adverbs"

In a similar manner the author has treated the chapter on conjunctions. We can only refer here to some few specialities. Thus the distinction of *aber*, *allein* *sondern* and *doch* (§ 384, d.) is very imperfectly given. He restricts *allein* to a "definite objection," which not being illustrated by any example, will hardly be understood. The force of *sondern* is thus illustrated:

It is more strongly adverbative than *aber*, being used only after a negative, and introducing some word which has a like construction with the one on which the force of the negative falls, and which is placed in direct antithesis with it: thus, *weil nicht eigene Macht, sondern Gott die Könige erretet*.

This explanation is neither clear nor correct. If by "direct antithesis" the author means "direct contrary," the following sentence: *Die wahre Darstellung billigt nicht, sondern sie erleuchtet* (Göthe D. u. B. 13, 174) would be a solecism, and must be changed into *aber sie erleuchtet*, which would destroy all its force. If it means "an opposition of meanings", the sentence *er beschließt es nicht, aber er wünscht es* would be faulty, while we may use *aber* or *sondern*, though with quite different force. The essential force of *sondern* is in its *corrective* power. It corresponds to the English "but rather" or "but on the contrary," while *aber* corresponds to "however." The synonyms of *sondern* (*vielmehr*, *hingegen* etc.) are not mentioned at all.

In the chapter on the arrangement of the sentence (p. 215) we have noticed many erroneous statements, of which we mention the remark "that a sentence after one containing *faum* must *always* have the form of an independent clause," as: *Raum war der Vater tobt, so kommt ein jeder mit seinem Ring*, "hardly was the father dead, when (literally *then*) each one comes with his ring." This is a strange mistake. The very sentence mentioned may be expressed in the form of a dependent clause, which is the *regular* case, thus: *Raum war der Vater tobt, als ein jeder — ankam*. Compare: *Raum hatte sich die Flut, verlaufen als der Boden schon wieder vor den Blicken der Geretteten lag*. Göthe D. u. B. 4, 157.

On page 216 the author says: "when a clause ends with two or more infinitives, the transposed verb is not allowed to be put after them, but is placed instead next before them." But we say: *da er Englisch sprechen lernen wollte*, where the transposed verb stands *after* the two infinitives. The rule given by the author must be restricted to the *compound tenses* of those verbs which have their participles in the form of an infinitive.

The chapter on construction of sentences (p. 204) is introduced by a lengthy discussion on the "analysis of the sentence," at which we were rather astonished when first reading it. The author says for instance that every assertive

¹ It is very peculiar to call the verb *sehen* (to look) here a verb with a *figurative* sense.

² The fact that the action is a figurative one can never be the cause of an accusative after the prepositions *an*, *in* etc. Such constructions are strictly treated, as if the verb had the corresponding local sense, and accordingly, require sometimes the dative and sometimes the accusative. This ought to have been illustrated by sufficient examples. From the author's statement, as it stands, the student must necessarily infer that the mentioned prepositions always must take an accusative of the governing verb if used in a figurative sense, and he would be induced to form faulty phrases, like: *ich habe etwas auf das Herz; ich bin in die Rothwendigkeit*.

³ Such phrases have been and may be satisfactorily explained. Thus *auf diese Weise* (in old German the dative was used in this phrase) means the same as the Latin *in hunc modum*, and the accusative denotes the *direction* into which the main action turns. *Über tausend Jahre* is easily explained by *going over a space of thousand years*. Such phrases have assumed the nature of standing formulas, and since they can only be learned practically, ought to be carefully collected by the practical grammarians.

⁴ The author speaks even of a period in which the "conversion" of adverbs into prepositions happened (p. 172). This sounds very much like conversion of seven-thirties into five-twenties.

sentence has arisen from two sentences, and that "he loves me," properly means "I assert that he loves me." The imperative sentence "Love me" is a change from the original "I request that you love me." This way of explaining things belongs in the Kindergarten, and hardly there, since it is void of all reality and misrepresents the way of thinking. The author overlooks that the "original" sentences from which he derives his assertive sentence, contain again two assertive sentences "I assert" and "he loves me," and that they each would again presuppose two "more original" sentences, which makes four and so on. He closes this discussion (2 pages of small print) with an "explanation" that is entirely unintelligible to us: "A negative sentence," he says, "is only one variety of the assertive, in which, of two opposite and mutually exclusive things, one is affirmed by the denial of the other. We can only apply to this statement Mephisto's words: Ein vollkommener Widerspruch ist gleich geheimnissvoll für Kluge wie für Thoren.

In concluding this review we must add a few words to prevent being misunderstood.

We have had to attack the author in many of his positions, but we are far from underrating the numerous excellent points of his work, not the least of which is that he has introduced a closer scrutiny of many grammatical questions hitherto altogether neglected. Although we had often to consider his views as untenable, the mere introduction of such points and their submission for further development to teachers and students must be deemed highly valuable and meritorious. We wish that the author might be induced to change his grammar so as to remove the objections which we have opposed. We have no doubt that he would be eminently successful if he would consent to reconsider impartially some of those opinions that he has advanced perhaps too quickly.

GUSTAVUS FISCHER.

CORRESPONDENCE.

MR. EDITOR,—In the fifth book of the "Library of Education," we have the opinions of the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish members of the community. Added to these are to be found in it elaborate arguments pro and con by secular writers, lectures by the clergy, harrangues by lawyers, of course on both sides of the question, and the decree of the Superior Court of Cincinnati. But there is one party in the country who certainly has special interests at stake in the decision of the question, who seems to be unrepresented. I mean the School Teacher. As one of the fraternity, permit me a space in your periodical to supply the omission. I ask this favor because there is a "method in my madness" in thus thrusting my opinions into the controversy, and also because I have an idea which I wish to set before the public, which will be found in the concluding paragraph of this letter.

Before I produce my compromise, for it is a compromise I intend to propose, I would say that the "vexed question" between our Catholic and Protestant brethren does not appear to be limited to—whether the Bible should be retained or excluded from our Public Schools?—but rather—whether moral training can be righteously separated from the intellectual training of youth? I confess, as an

experienced educator, that physical, intellectual, and moral training, are the *sine qua nons* of a perfect educational system, and that it is inexpedient to separate them. As a father in search of a school for my children, the first requisites I should seek for in their instructor would be moral calibre and self-command; the second, knowledge and ability to impart it; and the third—the order, cleanliness, and material surroundings of his academy. Were these all satisfactory, I could cheerfully surrender for the terms of the School sessions my parental powers over my children into his charge.

But it is impossible to apply such tests to State Education. Of necessity, the highest form of moral training must be considerably if not entirely dispensed with in our Public Schools. Is it too much to add that books touching on the subject should be carefully denuded of any comments which might be offensive to any part of the community? Take English History for example. Is a compilation from Hume's or Lingard's version of it to be used? Is Queen Mary or Queen Elizabeth to be distinguished by an offensive epithet? Were Cromwell's battles in Ireland praiseworthy or reprehensible? Alas! to almost every question in modern history, not excepting the later portion of our own, are there not two answers? Does not this view of the question affect Geography also, and to some extent interfere with some of the natural sciences? Not until an American Index Expurgatorius is issued, acquiesced in by men of all persuasions, containing a list of books proper to be used in the Public Schools, will the able arguments of those who contend for the withdrawal of the Bible, and the continuation of the present system of State support be entirely sound and complete.

But, as an Instructor, there is another phase of the subject which it is my duty to set before the public. A sickly and unworthy sentimentality, pandered to by certain presses, has largely deprived Public Teachers of their proper power of corporal punishment, inconsistently arming the policemen with a locust baton to make up for the omission. To this deprivation of a right, it is now proposed to largely decrease his moral power also, for such must be the effect of excluding the Bible from the Public Schools. To do so entirely will reduce him to a nonentity. A teacher who is not permitted to denounce lying, swearing, and thieving, as offences against the Deity, but is restricted to pronounce against such crimes merely that they are infractions of school edicts or State laws, will neither deserve nor have much attention paid by the children to his milk and water anathemas. But a school without God is surely a monstrosity which could not long exist. If we can obtain no more let us at least make a stand for the ten commandments for the honor of the Great Author of the same. There can be nothing in them justly objectionable to the Catholic, the Protestant, or the Jew. Even the Deist might be expected to acquiesce in the excellence of all save the fourth. As to pagan Chinamen, atheists and other madmen, they may be ruled out of consideration in this matter. Once more for the general good of

the Schools and the nation let us at least demand the Decalogue and the right to enforce its decrees as the laws of God. Stand by the Decalogue!

R. W. HUME.

P. S.—If the eleventh commandment could be admitted, so much the better; it surely would not mar the harmony of our schools to tell the children to "Love one another." If, however, our Jewish neighbors should object to it as an unauthorized addition, let us at least hope that it will be heeded by all Christians while discussing the subject of the Bible in the Public Schools.

ASTORIA, LONG ISLAND, June 4, 1870.

COLLEGE CATALOGUES RECEIVED.

RUTGERS COLLEGE, New Brunswick, N. J., Rev. William H. Campbell, D.D., LL.D., President. The number of instructors is 12; number of students, 151, of whom 46 are in the Scientific department, which has been constituted, by act of the Legislature, the State College for Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY, Ithaca, N. Y., Hon. Andrew D. White, LL.D., President. The number of resident instructors is 29; number of students, 563. There are seven non-resident Professors, who deliver lectures on various subjects.

COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Gen. Alex. S. Webb, President. There are 28 instructors connected with the institution. Of the 768 students, 400 are in the Introductory Class.

LAFAYETTE COLLEGE, Easton, Pa., Rev. W. C. Cattell, D.D., Pres. The number of instructors is 20, and the total number of students is 180, of whom four are resident graduates.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, Middletown, Conn., Rev. Joseph Cummings, D.D., LL.D., President, has a faculty of eleven members, the number of students being 153.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, Hanover, N. H., Rev. Asa D. Smith, Pres. The number of instructors is 32. The total number of students is 418, of whom 52 are in the Medical department, 289 in the Academic department, 70 in the Scientific department, and seven in the Agricultural department.

GENESEE COLLEGE, Lima, N. Y., Rev. D. Steele, D.D., LL.D., Acting Pres., has 66 students, and a faculty of four members.

MARIETTA COLLEGE, Marietta, Ohio, Rev. I. W. Andrews, D. D., President, has eight instructors and 57 students in the Collegiate department.

BOWDOIN COLLEGE, Brunswick, Maine, Rev. Samuel Harris, D.D., President, reports a faculty of 15 members; 87 medical students; a scientific class of 10; and 127 students in the College proper.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, Chapel Hill, N. C., Rev. Solomon Pool, President. Six professors and 35 students are reported.

TUFTS COLLEGE, Medford, Mass., Rev. A. A. Miner, D. D., Pres. There are 15 instructors, and 68 students in all the departments.

College Officers are requested to send, to the Editor, their new Catalogues as soon as issued.